



# Randviscracy: the Return of Athenian Democracy & the Case for Selection by Lot

Corey Daniels



# **Randviscracy: the Return of Athenian Democracy & the Case for Selection by Lot**

by Corey Daniels

“for as the government is, such will be the man.” -Plato, Republic

Dedicated to everyone aiding in the dismantling of the woke mind virus, liberal, globo-homo world order. This has been my chief aim since starting the Project for a New American Government in 2011. Thank you all and continue to be vigilant! -Corey Daniels

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## Table of Contents

Forward with update.....	8
What is Democracy?.....	9
What is called “our democracy” is a sham, it is really a smoke screen for kleptocracy (rule by thieves)!.....	9
How democracy has been undermined or rather how it is used as cover. Often by the same people/groups that promote the spread and defending of “democracy”.....	10
Racial voting blocks in Democracies.....	18
Trump election team’s effort to block voter fraud.....	19
Is the Trump administration a demonstration of oligarchy?.....	20
How to fix this obviously flawed, wasteful and corruptible system?.....	20
History of Sortition.....	22
The kleros etymology.....	22
The priests and kings, including the highest King Archon were elected by lot during the golden age of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.....	23
Cicero versus Verres for corrupting the selection of the Priests of Jupiter by lot.....	24
Cleromancy.....	24
The use of cleromancy by Judaic priests.....	25
Use of casting lots in the Bible.....	25
Cleromancy in ancient Germany.....	26
Divination in China, I Ching divination.....	26
The Founders of America on the tendency of democracy to devolve into oligarchy.....	28
Alexander Hamilton’s “representative democracy” as an oligarchic practice.....	31
What similarities are there in the structure of the American government with the Roman republic?.....	32
On the balance of power.....	34
Popular election versus aristocracy by lot.....	35
The use of sortition in Florence and Venice as a way to limit the game of thrones elite intrigues and power struggles.....	40
Modern democracies.....	42
Measuring democracy – how democratic are modern self-proclaimed democracies?.....	42
How do these factors come together to create an oligarchy/kleptocracy?.....	43
Examples of democracy spreading that America funds around the World. How really “democratic” are these governments?.....	43
Sortition and Randvicracy.....	46
Is random selection rarely used due to the risk of incompetency?.....	46

How to ensure competence?.....	46
Special interest versus the public interest.....	49
Study finds the benefits of random selection in promotion.....	50
Equality before the law vs equality of outcome. Why add weights to random selection?..	51
Plato’s Cave. What are the properties of a good statesman?.....	53
About the intelligence quotient (IQ).....	54
The National Merit Scholarship Program.....	55
Experience. Wisdom. The dual nature of intelligence.....	55
Why weighted selection is important.....	55
The Weighted Airman Promotion System.....	56
Voluntarily service for good alignment.....	56
No career politicians.....	58
Guardians.....	60
The problem of scale.....	60
Should there be an age limit for panel members? What about mental health qualifications?.....	61
Plato on the original democracy (sortition) as the ideal form of government.....	61
Plato’s argument against Athenian Democracy.....	62
Socrates on foreign influence when describing the Democratic man.....	63
More signs of the decline of a democratic state.....	63
How randviscracy blocks foreign influence.....	65
How each government form leads to the next.....	65
Checking for corruption and error.....	66
Ancient Greece’s Supreme Court.....	68
The creation of Athenian democracy.....	68
Athens court judges and juries were also selected by lot.....	70
Roman military and government appointments.....	70
Self-determination of the tribes in Greece.....	71
The Greek solution to the birth rate problem.....	71
Balance between aristocracy and oligarchy to create stability.....	72
Aristotle’s ideal democracy.....	73
Aristotle’s worst democracy.....	74
Aristotle predicts the current cultural decay. Society has been through this before.....	75
Proposed Randomly Selected Replacement for the House of Representatives by Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips.....	76
Corruption in modern representative democracy.....	76

Removing popular elections eliminates one of the key sources of corruption.....	77
The popularity contest of representative democracy   Competitive democracy.....	77
Elective legislature leads to a spirit of competition and divisiveness.....	78
Information theory and selecting panel size.....	79
Elite theory, the right to rule and the succession problem.....	80
What is an elite and who can claim the right to rule?.....	80
The succession problem.....	84
Sortition blocks the formation of a deep state bureaucracy due to the formation of personal and political ties.....	86
Career politicians: professional bribe takers.....	86
More people desire wealth than honor.....	87
Panel member and government official salaries.....	87
Media, religious and education control is critical, no matter the form of government.....	87
Comparisons to other forms of democracy and sortition.....	89
Direct democracy aka micro democracy versus representative democracy.....	89
Fractal sortition.....	89
Futarchy: government by prediction market.....	89
Citizen's assemblies.....	90
Deliberative democracy.....	93
The danger of adjusting representation numbers in the name of equity (equalized outcomes).....	95
People's Assembly example from Mongolia.....	95
Potential technology for a secure and efficient Randviscratic government system.....	95
Random selection in blockchain.....	96
Blockchain Technology for secure voting, courts and other government procedures for transparency.....	96
Potential vulnerabilities of blockchain voting and how to fortify against them.....	97
Voatz; a blockchain based voting app pilot tests in the U.S.....	98
How the Voatz voting process works.....	98
Follow My Vote; a voting system which uses blockchain to create an auditable and transparent records of votes.....	100
Experiments with blockchain voting in Ukraine.....	101
No Black Boxes. Panel/Jury selection and elections should be verifiable.....	103
Estonia i-voting system.....	104
Blockchain voting test in Zug Switzerland.....	104
Using AI to summarize information can help panels build consensus.....	105

Will artificial intelligence make randviscracy panel members obsolete?.....	105
An algorithm for merit-based sortition.....	106
The Singularity, merging with AI.....	107
The importance of truth in training artificial intelligence.....	107
How the use of AI may create a dystopia or a paradise.....	108
Opportunities for change.....	109

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## **Forward with update**

As I get ready to send this book to be published in February 2025, so much development has occurred with Elon Musk's DOGE that I must add an update. The levels of corruption being uncovered are staggeringly high. While there was plenty of evidence that fraud and waste were rampant, the levels being uncovered show that *it may be one of the primary reasons causing America to continuously exceed its budget, thus growing the national debt!*

Once the corruption and waste is stripped away, combined with the optimization of the military, making it efficient rather than a giant grift machine, not only can America balance the budget but we can reach a surplus. America can then start to earn interest rather than suffer debt slavery.

The system I put forward in Randviscracy can be used to prevent the future formation of clientelism and institutional capture, i.e. the formation of another deep state. Let us make the removal of the corrupt, parasitical deep state enduring.

-Corey Daniels

# What is Democracy?

## What is called “our democracy” is a sham, it is really a smoke screen for kleptocracy (rule by thieves)!

You hear a lot of use of the phrase “our democracy” by modern Western politicians but what does democracy really mean? What was the original form? And what really is what politicians call “our (their) democracy”?

The original Athenian democracy was what would now be called sortition. Most representatives were selected not by vote but by random selection aka by lot. The reason for the use of random selection was that they knew selection by voting led to the formation of an oligarchy. Aristotle described this devolution into oligarchy followed by mob rule, followed by tyranny. The Greeks had gone through this cycle.

What modern politicians call “our democracy” is in effect a kleptocracy (rule by thieves) or at best an oligarchy (rule by the few). The wisdom of the ancients has been forgotten and obfuscated. The founders of America sought to improve upon the Roman system which was itself an attempt to balance the forms of government the Greek philosophers had debated. But the founders of America knew that ultimately it depended on the character of the American people to uphold its government. We have subsequently descended into the state of oligarchy which the Greeks experienced.

A great deal of lip-service is paid to Greece as the birthplace of democracy, but most of those that pay it know very little about the details or even the principles of Greek democratic government, let alone about how the Greeks themselves regarded it. One thing that all Greeks were clear about was the difference between election and lottery and the importance of that difference. A state could only be called democratic in so far as the holding of political office and the membership of governing bodies was determined by lot. A state that employed elections and which voted candidates into office was an oligarchy. It is clear that on this criterion, all modern states are oligarchies, not democracies. Indeed, apart from the English and American jury, there is scarcely a democratic institution to be found in the modern world. What is more, there is not even any demand for one.<sup>1</sup>

This descent into oligarchy follows the [iron law of oligarchy](#), "Who says organization, says oligarchy", coined by Robert Michels, a German sociologist who wrote in his book, *Political Parties*, in 1911 that all organizations inevitably develop into an oligarchy through the organization of a small group of leaders. This is due to the need for a structure, a bureaucracy to manage any complex social system.

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<sup>1</sup> Pope, Maurice. *The Keys to Democracy (Sortition and Public Policy Book 13)* (p. 173). Andrews UK Limited 2023.

# How democracy has been undermined or rather how it is used as cover. Often by the same people/groups that promote the spread and defending of “democracy”.

To show the scope of how broken the system currently is, I will list known exploits of the democratic system, particularly in America. These exploits are well-known, yet they are allowed to persist in primarily Democrat ran states, I believe to give plausible deniability when some “democratic adjustments” are needed.

1. Not requiring identification or using weak forms of verification.

Proof of identity verification is undermined by framing it as discriminatory/racist, labeled “[voter suppression](#)”. This exposes the biases of those making the claim, they put forward the reasoning that minorities are so low agency they can’t acquire identification. Exceptions to identification requirements like this aren’t made for minorities for other vital government functions, such as driving permits, buying alcohol or cigarettes.

a. Expanding what types of identification are accepted is another method of undermining the voting process. For example allowing student IDs and other forms of identification which are much easier than a driver's license to get fakes of. ([source for overview of voter ID laws per state](#))

[Newsom law blocking requiring ID to vote.](#)

b. A Gallup poll found that 84% of American voters favor photo identification requirements at their voting place.<sup>2</sup>

In Michigan a 19 year old Chinese immigrant student at the University of Michigan was able to vote despite not being a citizen. The only reason we know his story is because he asked for his ballot back after submitting it he was then charged with election fraud.<sup>3</sup> Astonishingly his vote was still counted in the election because once a ballot is passed through the tabulator machine it can no longer be traced back to who cast the vote. There is no mark or identifying information on the ballot.<sup>4</sup>

In the 2024 presidential election, coincidentally the Democrat candidate Kamala Harris won in every state which [did not require voter ID](#).

A February 2025 poll found that 77% of Americans support voter ID.<sup>5</sup>

2. Mail-in voting, absentee ballots and ballot drop boxes. With no federal standard for

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<sup>2</sup> [Americans Endorse Both Early Voting and Voter Verification | Gallup](#)

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2024/10/chinese-student-attending-university-mi-voted-michigans-election/>

<sup>4</sup> [Chinese citizen charged after allegedly voting illegally in key battleground state; vote will be counted, Fox News](#)

<sup>5</sup> [Election Integrity: 77% Favor Voter ID | Rasmussen Reports](#)

mail-in ballots some state's ballots are susceptible to fraud. Even with all the issues seen during the 2020 election, there have not yet been federal standards created. States' rights are important but the federal government should not accept votes coming from systems which are knowingly allowing fraud. For example in Georgia, Democrats [sued to prevent the monitoring of ballot drop boxes](#). As people have commented this would mean that a candy bar at a gas station has better security protecting it than a ballot. The candy bar is tracked to the store, monitored on camera while in the store to prevent theft and then scanned and recorded as sold when it is purchased.

In 2020 there was a massive effort led by Michael Podhorzer of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AF-CIO), a group of 56 national and international unions, to "fortify" the election by expanding drop boxes and mail-in voting. He was funded with over \$400 million from COVID funds using the CARES Act which went to State election administrators and also \$300 million from the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative. Podhorzer was aided by the National Vote at Home Institute, which worked in 37 states to "bolster mail-in voting".<sup>6</sup>

Some weak points of using mail-in ballots include:

a. Chain of custody. Every time the ballot changes hands there is an opportunity for tampering. On many ballots, the identity of the voter is on the envelope so once the ballot is removed there is no way to verify the voter's eligibility. [The State of Michigan got into trouble in 2024 for deleting drop off box surveillance footage](#).

b. Interception. Ballots can end up getting thrown away. [Video evidence of postal workers throwing away mail-in ballots](#). In September 2024 the US Postal Service (USPS) changed how they would be handling mail-in ballots. Rather than process the ballots at centralized processing facilities where the ballots would be scanned and an image recorded for later verification, the ballots were instead going to be sent directly to the local board of elections facilities, without imaging. This change makes it harder to catch if ballots are intercepted or changed in transit.

The USPS will no longer be able to confirm the volume of mail-in ballots sent to election officials, nor will there be a way to ensure that fraudulent ballots are not introduced into the system or legitimate ballots excluded.<sup>7</sup>

c. Sabotage by poll workers. Subjective interpretation. For example rejecting ballots for an opponent candidate. In the 2020 Presidential election a water pipe leak was used to send Republican oversight home while Democrats [continued to process ballots](#).

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<sup>6</sup> [Secret 2020 Election Campaign | Time Magazine](#)

<sup>7</sup> [How USPS Politicization and Last-Minute Changes Put Election Confidence at Risk](#)

d. Lack of voter identity verification. [Not all states require signature verification](#). Notice that the states which had late night ballot drops which occurred after independent poll watchers had left for the day, do not have this requirement. Thousands of hours of security footage of the vote drop off boxes showed people dropping off batches of votes.

Georgia [bans counties from rejecting ballots](#) that have the incorrect birth date, as a civil rights issue.

e. Framing purposely not purging voting roles as “[protecting voters](#)”.

f. Vote harvesting. Community organizers, people paid to in turn pay people in their community for their votes.

Most countries do not allow mail in ballots due to the vulnerabilities it introduces. There was a meme about countries banning mail-in voting that was [debunked](#) and the reason it is debunked is because the countries didn't ban it, they never allowed it in the first place! The places which do allow it severely restrict it for the reasons I have listed. In 2019 COVID created justification for widespread mail-in ballots with well-known vulnerabilities.

Media and government representatives repeated a mantra that the 2020 election was “[the most secure election in American history](#).” Yes this is a real Orwellian “trust us everything is under control” quote from the [Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council during the Trump Administration](#).

In-person voting and waiting time:

There should not be long waiting queues to vote. It seems these issues are due to incompetent and slow poll workers in these areas. Artificial intelligence, automation and blockchain allowing for secure remote voting should help with these issues.

3. Limiting choice of representatives. Controlling the selection process of political parties. Blocking candidates not under their control, like what they did to Ron Paul, tried to do to Donald Trump. Dennis Kucinich. I remember the Republican convention where they did a vocal vote and the [teleprompter caught that they had already decided against Ron Paul before the vote even started](#). In 2016 there were [allegations](#) that the primaries were rigged in favor of Hillary Clinton versus Bernie Sanders.

There are shenanigans in elections all the time as you can see in this [history of election controversies](#). It is safe to say it is the norm rather than the exception. Reminds me of the saying in baseball that “[if you ain't cheating, you ain't trying](#).”

4. Donors and lobbyists aid their preferred candidates by funding them, or their

opponents. Lobbies like [AIPAC](#) will [fund the opponents of candidates who don't follow their bidding](#).

5. Media control. Biased media giving favorable coverage to a candidate. Not reporting bad press about the favored candidate. Making up lies about candidates not under their control.

a. Social media control. Censoring support of the opponent. Suppressing unfavorable new stories, a good example is the suppression of the [Hunter Biden laptop story](#) through direct pressuring of social media companies.

b. Deceptive presentation. For example in 2024 the White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre reported that violent crime was at a 50 year low. She didn't mention that the reason was that [less police agencies were reporting crime statistics to the FBI](#), including the LAPD and NYPD!

6. Lawfare, the use of the legal system to intimidate, harass, waste the funds of opponents. Prosecuting people who stand in the way of voter fraud. For example Tina Peters from Colorado received 9 years in prison for saving a copy of 2020 voting data that the secretary of state had ordered destroyed. ([source 1](#) [source 2](#))

7. Astroturfing. Using bots and paid shills online and paid attendees & protesters to make movements and political positions seem more popular than they really are. This “primes the pump” of the cognitively feminine mind that wants to go along with the herd and in order to be accepted into the herd will adopt the position which seems to be the most dominant. There are firms which specialize in influencing elections like this. An Israeli company was [caught on hidden camera](#) discussing manipulating over 30 elections to sell their services.

An event broadcast in 2024 was titled *Kamala Harris' Univision Town Hall*, rather than being a public town hall meeting it was really just a room full of Kamala's supporters who were [selected by a casting company and had an “audience manager”](#).

Another example of astroturfing is when the Kamala Harris presidential campaign was [caught manipulating community notes on X](#) (Twitter) in order to “artificially manufacture consensus by making pro-Kamala Harris messages on social media appear more popular than they are.” The campaign was also caught [manipulating the Reddit algorithm](#).

a. A more insidious form is the use of agent provocateurs. These are paid actors, many times government officials who pose as members of a protest movement. They commit acts of vandalism or violence in order to justify a police crack down to end the protest.

8. Terrorism. Using violent groups like Antifa to intimidate political rallies to prevent the spreading of an opponent's message. Oftentimes these groups are protected by and work with

government officials. This has happened at political rallies when Antifa attacked a protester and the protester drew a gun to defend themselves, at which time undercover agents drew their weapons, revealing their presence among the protesters who were just committing crimes of vandalism or violence and the agents were not stopping them. An example was in [New Mexico in 2020 when a statue of a conquistador was being pulled down.](#)

a. False Flags. Fake attacks to trigger the “circle the wagons” effect in the population to support war.

9. Economic manipulation. Crashing stock markets to turn people against an administration. Monetary policy, causing inflation or crashes by adjusting interest rates. Using investment firms to influence corporate messaging which also controls advertising and media messaging.

10. Factionalism. Weaponizing foreign populations, women, minorities, economic classes through the amplification of grievances both real, exaggerated or if needed fabricated/staged. Examples of factions commonly weaponized:

a. Foreign populations/immigrants. Receptive to their homeland’s messaging. These populations can also be recruited to aid foreign intelligence operations to undermine/influence elections. This includes media contacts, routing funds/bribes, instigating protests, planting agent provocateurs into political rallies/groups. Influencing legal policies and the funding of organizations pro and against the interests of the foreign power.

b. Manipulating women and the cognitively female who are more susceptible to influence using emotion based propaganda / atrocity propaganda.

c. Minorities. Recruited as saboteurs, protesters. Made into hostile voting blocks.

d. Class warfare. Timing strikes to interfere with elections. Voting blocks used to influence candidates to favor policies of the controlling or influencing power. Communist style revolutionaries.

e. Undermining the family unit and birth rates. Rather than the family voting based on the father’s leading determination, the emotional propaganda splits the family’s vote by sex. Framing people as interchangeable economic units encourages women to forgo family creation so there are less families which tend to have more conservative values.

10. Low IQ / low information voters. Trump said in a speech October 9<sup>th</sup> 2024. “That’s the real threat to democracy, stupid people. Our biggest threat to democracy is stupid people.” Low IQ people want immediate benefit. They don’t plan long term. This is called high time

preference. These people are swayed by media messaging which uses conditioning techniques which appeal to the lizard brain part of the subconscious. They do this through scaring with dark music, images. Labeling a person as a bad person or a threat along with subconscious cues to make the people associate this person with harm. This is why you see mentally ill political supporters showing extreme, fanatical outrage against whomever the establishment wants to point them at. They load the sub consciousnesses of these people to trigger the protective instinct.

Subversives also purposely promote low IQ people for office because they are easily duped into betraying the long term interests of their own nation.

11. Obfuscation of law. Creating bill proposals that are thousands of pages long and delivering them up for vote with not enough time for them to be read. Therein can be obscured theft of the nations resources, favors for their allies, loopholes to get around existing laws, etc.

12. Blackmail. Luring candidates using sex and drugs early in their careers to gain blackmail control to use as a leash on them later. The goal being institutional capture as compromised/controlled assets are used to bring in more members of the controlling group.

13. Indoctrination via the educational system. They slip indoctrination into the education system to condition voters to be more receptive to a particular agenda. This primes the population so that in college they are then ripe to be radicalized and recruited into a network of political activists. Following this indoctrination acts as a screening and preselection system. One could also become adept at imitating or signaling ([shibboleth](#)) membership of the in-group by passing through this indoctrination. This in itself is a filter for sociopathy.

14. Entitlements, welfare, pork spending. Politicians buy votes and support through promising bills to give money and preferential treatment to voting blocks, commercial and special interest groups. An example from October 2024 was a poll which showed that Kamala Harris was unpopular with black men. A week later she proposed giving black entrepreneurs a 20 thousand dollar “forgivable” loan. A forgivable loan is not a loan, it is a grant, a handout. Using tax money of all groups to buy the votes of one minority group. An example of how multicultural representative democracy is prone to create internal strife.

15. Deceptive wording of referendums. Referendums, similarly to polls, can trick the person to steer them towards a particular answer. Some methods include leading questions, loaded language and order effects. Polling experts will use these techniques to get the intended results, sometimes performing multiple polls until they get the intended results.

“Leading questions are designed to guide the respondent to a particular answer, while limited response options restrict the possible answers that can be given. Loaded

language uses emotionally charged words to sway the respondent's opinion, while order effects occur when the order of the questions or responses influences the answer given.”<sup>8</sup>

Polls and referendums do not allow the voters to give feedback or investigate. A panel in randviscracy would have these powers in order to both make a better decision and to inform future panelists.

16. Exploiting differences in regional versus national interests. An example would be for example if Texas becomes majority Hispanic and their voters decide to not enforce border controls which then allows millions of migrants over time to change the makeup of the entire country.

17. Electronic voting systems. Votes can be changed by adjudicators who are given the authority to decide what the intent of the voter is. If the paper ballots are subsequently destroyed there is no way to prove if votes were switched or [counted multiple times](#). [Here is a video demonstration](#).

a. Security vulnerabilities.

1. Outdated software. “In 2019, the Associated Press reported that the vast majority of 10,000 election jurisdictions nationwide, including numerous swing states, were still using Windows 7 or older operating systems to produce ballots, program voting machines, count votes, and report results.”<sup>9</sup>

2. Remote access software and voting machines connected to the internet. “Dominion Voting Systems, the second-largest US. election machine vendor, which has given public presentations acknowledging their use of modems in their voting machines, was also discovered to be running [remote-access software](#) during the 2020 election:

In Georgia, 20-year election worker, Susan Voyles, testified that Dominion Voting Systems employees “operated remotely” on her ballot-marking devices and poll pads after the team experienced some technical problems with their machines.

In Wisconsin, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), headed by former state Supreme Court Justice Michael Gableman, also found that Dominion and ES&S voting machines were online and connected to the internet.”<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> [Recognizing Manipulation: A Guide to Identifying Biased Polling](#)

<sup>9</sup> [AP Exclusive: New election systems use vulnerable software, AP News](#)

<sup>10</sup> <https://x.com/KanekoTheGreat/status/1648469906797793281>

“Senator Elizabeth Warren published an article on her website on the vulnerabilities of the United States' election system titled "Strengthening Our Democracy" on June 25, 2019:

"The harsh truth is that our elections are extremely vulnerable to attack: Forty-two states use voter registration databases that are more than a decade old. Laughably, in 2019, some still use Windows 2000 and Windows XP.”<sup>11</sup>

3. Back doors installed into hardware. The windows hardware used on the voting machines (x86 processors) are known to have [root-level backdoor access](#) installed into the CPU via the Secure Boot system. Because of this, the intelligence of America or whomever hacks into this system, which has occurred with [Chinese hackers accessing back doors in cell phone service providers](#) would then have access to the voting machines and the communication networks they are accessed through.

Dominion voting machines use Cradlepoint routers which are [manufactured in China](#). The voting machines themselves also use parts from Dell which are [sourced from China](#) and then assembled in Taiwan. Dominion [failed to disclose to Congress](#) that the motherboard used in their machine was both sourced from and tested in China. Other voting machine manufacturers such as [ES&S](#) have this same issue.

Why is America using voting machines running on Windows OS with hardware sourced from China that have network hardware and internet access? This is the voting equivalent of anarcho-tyranny, purposefully leaving the front door unlocked to facilitate election manipulation.

18. Not cleaning voter rolls. This is to cover fraudulent votes. Leaving dead voters, voters who have moved. Errors and duplicates, like multiple people being registered as having addresses at commercial buildings. Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont had more people on the rolls than are eligible to vote as of October 2024!<sup>12</sup> Michigan for example has 8.4 million registered voters in a state with a population of less than 8 million.<sup>13</sup>

United Sovereign Americans for Freedom, a not-for-profit group has analyzed the official 2022 voting records of 21 different states and they have found the following:

- 29 million ineligible voter registrations

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<sup>11</sup> <https://x.com/KanekoTheGreat/status/1648488368207196161>

<sup>12</sup> [New Judicial Watch Study Finds 353 U.S. Counties in 29 States with Voter Registration Rates Exceeding 100%](#)

<sup>13</sup> [Video: Steve Baldwin reveals that voter rolls in swing states are full of illegal voters & ghost names.](#)

- 10 million votes cast by ineligible registrants
- 2 million more votes counted than voters who voted
- 13% average vote error rate<sup>14</sup>

The Biden/Harris administration sued states to prevent them from [removing non-citizens from voter rolls](#).

There were 4 million excess voters removed by [lawsuits brought by Judicial Watch in 2024](#).

19. Legislative interpretation. Even if the majority of people support a piece of legislation and vote for it, judges can overturn it. An example is 1964 Proposition 14 in California which was to allow freedom of association in selling property. It would have overturned forced integration of neighborhoods. It passed in every county in California by a 2 to 1 majority.<sup>15</sup> Another example was Proposition 22 which defined marriage as between a man and a woman passed with a 62% majority.<sup>16</sup> Again on the same issue Proposition 8 also passed and was struck down. These show that time and again the will of the people can be bypassed using Judicial control via interpretation.

20. Counting non-citizens in censuses to determine the number of representatives, in America this would include Congress and the Electoral College. The [Census Bureau counts all residents](#), regardless of citizenship status and it [always has](#)! A bill passed by the House; [H.R.7109 – Equal Representation Act](#) would add a checkbox on the Census for citizenship status.

## **Racial voting blocks in Democracies**

[Statistics show a wide racial voting pattern difference](#). Polls show that the only group which does not favor its own in-group over out-groups are liberal whites. The cause of this is most likely a combination of neoteny and post WW2 indoctrination.

Remarkably, white liberals were the only subgroup exhibiting a pro-outgroup bias — meaning white liberals were more favorable toward nonwhites and are the only group to show this preference for groups other than their own. Indeed, on average, white liberals rated ethnic and racial minority groups 13 points (or half a standard deviation) warmer than whites.<sup>17</sup>

Immigrants, minority ballot harvesting, urbanization leading to [majority minority capture](#); or those who steer them, especially in urban population centers.

<sup>14</sup> <https://x.com/DefiantlyFree/status/1844857412857061626>

<sup>15</sup> [California Proposition 14, Right to Decline Selling or Renting Residential Properties to Persons Initiative \(1964\)](#), Ballotpedia

<sup>16</sup> [California Proposition 22, Definition of Marriage Initiative \(March 2000\)](#), Ballotpedia

<sup>17</sup> [White liberals view other races more warmly than they do Whites. Why?. Medium](#)

Voting, which we have made the instrument which will set us on the throne of the world by teaching even the very smallest units of members of the human race to vote by means of meetings and agreements by groups, will then have served its purposes and will play its part then for the last time by a unanimity of desire to make close acquaintance with us before condemning us (emphasis added)

## **Trump election team's effort to block voter fraud**

In 2024, Donald Trump and his team of Republicans worked to prevent election fraud by utilizing 230,000 poll observers and 500 attorneys in every swing state. Trump warned that people caught committing election fraud would face the maximum penalties under the law.

Changes made to voting laws in the Georgia Supreme Court decided that votes had to be [received by midnight](#) on election day. 18 states still allow ballots to be received after voting day, providing they are postmarked on or before election day, including California, New York, Oregon, and Washington D.C.

A discrepancy found during the 2024 elections was that the down ballot (specifically Congress) results [did not align with the popular vote](#). This points toward potential fraud in the down ballot elections. In Arizona there were the following irregularities in the Senate race between [Kari Lake \(Republican\) and Ruben Gallego \(Democrat\)](#). Gallego had 127k [more](#) votes than there are registered Democrats in AZ. Lake had 200 thousand [fewer](#) votes than there are registered Republicans in AZ. Gallego received more votes than Kamala Harris did in AZ. Lake received 140 thousand fewer votes than Trump did in AZ.

In Wisconsin's senate race the absentee ballots weren't reported until [3:30 AM](#), which is apparently [considered normal there according to "fact checkers"](#) but yet it was a [surprise to one of the candidates](#). and went 83% for the Democrat candidate which pushed Democrats into the lead and to ultimately win.

"I was shocked by what unfolded on Election Night," he said. "At 1 am, I was receiving calls of congratulations and, based on the models, it appeared I would win the Senate race. Then, at 4 am, the City of Milwaukee reported approximately 108,000 absentee ballots with Senator Baldwin receiving nearly 90 percent of those ballots.

"Statistically, this outcome seems improbable, as it didn't match the patterns from same day voting in Milwaukee, where I received 22 percent of the votes. "

In a vacuum, this could be chalked up to Milwaukee's Democrat voters still voting absentee at a much higher rate than Republicans, but Hovde noted that it also coincided with conspicuously high voter turnout in multiple wards.

“Since last Wednesday, numerous parties reached out to me about voting inconsistencies such as certain precincts in Milwaukee having turnout of 150 percent of registered voters and in some cases over 200 percent,” he explained, adding that “this was accomplished by same day voter registration that surged by almost 50 percent on a rainy day.”

Several poll workers and election observers have since come forward with similar stories of massive same day voter registration on Election Day in the most heavily Democratic precincts. While this is not per se evidence of illegality in those registrations, it does echo a criminal conspiracy in Milwaukee 20 years ago.<sup>18</sup>

There was later a recount in Wisconsin of 34,000 votes due to a “[snafu with some of their machines](#)”.

## **Is the Trump administration a demonstration of oligarchy?**

The Trump administration is essentially an oligarchy, as far as who has influence and decision making power. Trump is a billionaire. He is funded by billionaires like Sheldon Adelson (and later Sheldon’s wife, [Miriam](#)). Billionaire Elon Musk contributed greatly to Trump’s 2024 victory. This is nothing against Trump, Elon or the Trump administration, it is just what it takes to win an election under the current structure. Popular elections are popularity contests and of course those with more resources have more influence. This was obvious going back to the founding of Democracy in Greece. For this reason the Greeks made use of random selection rather than popular vote.

## **How to fix this obviously flawed, wasteful and corruptible system?**

As you can see from the list above, representative democracy has many weak points that can be exploited by those who want to capture a nation, especially with the universal application of mail-in voting after the COVID-19 pandemic. The ancients knew that as the very beginning of democracy. The elites today know this. It is a sham! The purpose of this book is not merely to document the flaws and weak points however but to put forward the case for sortition, specifically in the form that I call randviscracy. Why continue to use a flawed version of democracy, one the Greeks had already discovered did not work thousands

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<sup>18</sup> [Compelling Evidence of Irregularities in Wisconsin’s Senate Election, IOTReport](#)

of years ago? Why allow criminal mafias and hostile foreign elements to exploit these well known flaws? Why waste hundreds of millions of dollars on campaigns that most people are annoyed by? Why continue this form of democracy when it was known since the beginning to end in oligarchy?

I propose we set back on the path the ancients suggested by using random selection to eliminate most corruption. In randviscracy, the form of sortition/democracy which I propose also addresses the potential weaknesses of selection by lot. See my book *Randviscracy: Ending Corruption in Government* for a full prescription for the correction of civilization. The present book will go over historic and modern cases and arguments for and against selection by lot aka sortition to test and prove why it is the solution to the problem of corruption in government.

Plato was right about democracy but the term has been hijacked and is misrepresented. In the name of “democracy” politicians now justify American/Western neoliberal/neoconservative/globalist overthrowing of governments, in essence modern economic imperialism.

The practice of sortition, Athenian democracy is so out of use/disconnected that it seems alien to modern people who think of the term democracy being synonymous with voting. “A monograph written about 120 years ago opened with these words:

There is no institution of ancient history which is so difficult of comprehension as that of electing officials by lot. We have ourselves no experience of the working of such a system; any proposal to introduce it now would appear so ludicrous that it requires some effort for us to believe that it ever did prevail in a civilized community.<sup>19»20</sup>

Have we been in a political dark age since the original true form of democracy, the Athenian form?

There is a surprising lack in the use of randomization to prevent corruption since the time of the Athenian democracy.

The [golden-age philosophers](#) come from the era of true democracy, [selection by lot during the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries BC](#).

The democracies/republics after the anti-monarch revolutions of the 18<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> centuries have been exploited in many ways with political machines, media control and voting block capture.

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<sup>19</sup> Delannoi, G., Dowlen, O., & Stone, P. (2011). *The Lottery as a Democratic Institution*. Dublin: Policy Institute, Sciences Po.

<sup>20</sup> [Ephraim, David. Selection by Lot and Democracy: New Trend, Ancient Model](#)

Voting, which we have made the instrument which will set us on the throne of the world by teaching even the very smallest units of members of the human race to vote by means of meetings and agreements by groups, will then have served its purposes and will play its part then for the last time by a unanimity of desire to make close acquaintances with us before condemning us.

5. To secure this we must have everybody vote without distinction of classes and qualifications, in order to establish an absolute majority, which cannot be got from the educated propertied classes.<sup>21</sup>

Athenian democracy is an example of one of the most extensive uses of random selection. Random selection was also used by Venetians and the Catholic Church, primarily to limit “game of thrones” type of internal competition for power. Sortition works well for limiting corruption and political intrigue but what I have found in my research is that because politics is a game of control, by its very nature it attracts those with the will to power. Random selection is the antithesis of control, it is chance. Regardless of how religious various governments have been, most did not leave selection of the rulers in God’s hands by using selection by lot like many of the ancients like the Greeks and Judeans. Monarchies inadvertently practice random selection without knowing because gene selection during meiosis is a random process, albeit from a narrow pool!

## **History of Sortition**

### **The kleros etymology**

The Greek word kleros meant a piece of wood which was used like a die for random selection, i.e. lot. Kleros is the root of the word Clergy, which originally were selected by lot.

**kleros** - root of cleric, clerk, clergy. The etymology goes back to pre-Greek Indo-European. It comes from the piece of wood to cast a lot with. You can see the trace of the etymology through the whole structure of society:

Definition • (klêros) m (genitive)second declension (Epic, Attic, Ionic, Koine)

- A lot
- That which is assigned by lot, an allotment
- A farm
- An inheritance
- The clergy

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<sup>21</sup> Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. Protocol 10.

## **The priests and kings, including the highest King Archon were elected by lot during the golden age of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle**

In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon. YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely. STRANGER: But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who now come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the former class disappears and the scene changes?<sup>22</sup>

The appointment of priests should be left to God, — that is, to the lot; but the person elected must prove that he is himself sound in body and of legitimate birth, and that his family has been free from homicide or any other stain of impurity. Priests and priestesses are to be not less than sixty years of age, and shall hold office for a year only.<sup>23</sup>

The officers of the temples shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to God, that He may do what is agreeable to Him. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life.<sup>24</sup>

Randviscracy also filters candidates. 75% European ancestry requirement to become a citizen. No crimes of fraud, treason or corruption. Women and men both allowed. Weighted by IQ and experience which will favor age to a point with more experience while there is no hard limit like the 60 years old minimum for priests in Greece. Men will have an advantage in highly competitive fields/specializations as they have a wider spread on both the high end and low of the IQ spectrum.<sup>25</sup>

“The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.” -Ecclesiastes 1:9

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<sup>22</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 2507). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>23</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 2799). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>24</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (pp. 3114-3115). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>25</sup> National Randviscracy – Ending the Corruption in Government by Corey Daniels (p. 9)

# Cicero versus Verres for corrupting the selection of the Priests of Jupiter by lot

Cicero mentions the sacredness of selecting the priests of Jupiter by lot in his accusations against Verres for corruption and extortion:

LI. Do not wait for me to go through all the cities of Sicily in my speech. In this one statement I comprehend everything,—that no one could be made a senator while he was prætor except those who had given him money. And I carry on the same charge to all magistracies, agencies, and priesthoods; by which acts he has not only trampled on the laws of men, but on all the religious reverence due to the immortal gods. There is at Syracuse a law respecting their religion, which enjoins a priest of Jupiter to be taken by lot every year, and that priesthood is considered among the Syracusans as the most honourable. When three men have been selected by vote out of the three classes of citizens, the matter is decided by lot. He by his absolute command had contrived to have his intimate friend Theomnastus returned among the three by vote. When it came to the decision by lot, which he could not command, men were waiting to see what he would do. The fellow at first forbade them to elect by lot, as that seemed the easiest way, and ordered Theomnastus to be appointed without casting lots. The Syracusans say that cannot possibly be done, according to the reverence due to their sacred laws; they say it would be impious. He orders the law to be read to him. It is read. In it was written, “that as many lots were to be thrown into the urn as there were names returned; that he whose name was drawn was to have the priesthood.” He then, an ingenious and clever man! said, “Capital! it is written, ‘As many lots as there are names returned;’ how many names then were returned?” It is answered, “Three.” “Is there then anything necessary except that three lots should be put in, and one drawn out?” “Nothing.” He orders three lots to be put in, on all of which was written the name of Theomnastus. A great outcry arises, as it seemed to every one a scandalous and infamous proceeding. And so by these means that most honourable priesthood is given to Theomnastus.<sup>26</sup>

## Cleromancy

Cleromancy is the use of randomization by religious figures. The purpose could have been to determine the will of God or predict the future. Randomization is not controlled by man so this is a way of making decisions and judgments impartially.

Cleromancy was generally a way of impartial judgment; a [hierophant](#) (Greek for “the holy<sup>27</sup> to reveal”) could become the conduit of God’s will through the interpretation of random signs.

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<sup>26</sup> [THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SECOND PLEADING AGAINST CAIUS VERRES. CONCERNING HIS MANNER OF DECIDING CAUSES AS JUDGE WHILE IN SICILY. Cicero](#)

<sup>27</sup> [The word “holy” is related to the following words: whole, hail, wassail \(spiced ale for Christmas\) and health.](#)

The first proof of Cleromancy can be dated back to ancient Egypt and China. In the time of Rome, it was associated with the God Mercury. Which is also considered to be the patron of Cleromancy.<sup>28</sup>

## The use of cleromancy by Judaic priests

The priests of Judaism wore an apron called the ephod which had a breast piece on it called the hoshen. Part of it were two mysterious divination objects, the [Urim and Thummim](#). In the Hebrew Bible, the Urim (Hebrew: אֲרִיִּים 'Ūrīm, "lights") and the Thummim (Hebrew: תְּמִיִּם Tummīm, meaning uncertain, possibly "perfections") are elements of the hoshen, the breastplate worn by the High Priest attached to the ephod. They are connected with cleromancy (with divination by casting lots)."

From the use of the verbs hippil and nilkad in connection with the Urim (verses 41–42), it appears that they were a kind of lot ((marked) stones or sticks?), since these verbs occur in connection with the casting of lots (Isa. 34:17; I Sam. 10:20). They were suitable for indicating which of two alternatives was right; hence inquiries to be decided by them were designed to elicit "yes" or "no" answers (I Sam. 23:10–12;30:8).<sup>29</sup>

## Use of casting lots in the Bible

Among many cultures, deciding by randomization takes it out of mankind' hands and places the decision into God's hands. This both has the effect of increasing fairness and reducing the possibility of foul play and corruption.

(Heb. goral, a "pebble"), a small stone used in casting lots (Num. 33:54; Jonah 1:7). The lot was always resorted to by the Hebrews with strictest reference to the interposition of God, and as a method of ascertaining the divine will (Prov. 16:33), and in serious cases of doubt (Esther 3:7). Thus the lot was used at the division of the land of Canaan among the several tribes (Num. 26:55; 34:13), at the detection of Achan (Josh. 7:14, 18), the election of Saul to be king (1 Sam. 10:20, 21), the distribution of the priestly offices of the temple service (1 Chr. 24:3, 5, 19; Luke 1:9), and over the two goats at the feast of Atonement (Lev. 16:8). Matthias, who was "numbered with the eleven" (Acts 1:24-26), was chosen by lot. This word also denotes a portion or an inheritance (Josh. 15:1; Ps. 125:3; Isa. 17:4), and a destiny, as assigned by God (Ps. 16:5; Dan. 12:13).

There are rulers and there are subjects in states. And the first claim to rule is that of parents to rule over their children; the second, that of the noble to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder must govern the younger; in the fourth place, the slave must

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<sup>28</sup> [Cleromancy – All You Need to Know](#)

<sup>29</sup> [Ancient Jewish History: The Urim & Thummim](#)

obey his master; fifthly, there is the power of the stronger, which the poet Pindar declares to be according to nature; sixthly, there is the rule of the wiser, which is also according to nature, as I must inform Pindar, if he does not know, and is the rule of law over obedient subjects. 'Most true.' And there is a seventh kind of rule which the Gods love, — in this the ruler is elected by lot. (emphasis added, see for more about the seventh kind of rule)<sup>30</sup>

The Coptic Orthodox Church uses drawing lots to choose the Coptic pope, most recently done in November 2012 to choose Pope Tawadros II.<sup>31</sup>

## Cleromancy in ancient Germany

Tacitus wrote about the Germans' use of cleromancy using tree branches.

"To divination and casting of lots, they pay attention beyond any other people. Their method of casting lots is a simple one: they cut a branch from a fruit-bearing tree and divide it into small pieces which they mark with certain distinctive signs and scatter at random onto a white cloth. Then, the priest of the community if the lots are consulted publicly, or the father of the family if it is done privately, after invoking the gods and with eyes raised to heaven, picks up three pieces, one at a time, and interprets them according to the signs previously marked upon them."<sup>32</sup>

## Divination in China, I Ching divination

The I Ching, the [Yijing](#) or Yi King is a guide to divination and life wisdom which dates back at least to the time of Confucius 1300 BC. The alleged author [Wenwang](#) (later known as King Wen) came up with the Hexagram meanings from a tortoise shell.

(i) The earliest mention of the classic is found in the The Yî mentioned in the Official Book of Kâu Official Book of the Kâu dynasty, where it is said that, among the duties of 'the Grand Diviner,' 'he had charge of the rules for the three Yî (systems of Changes), called the Lien-shan, the Kwei-ûhang, and the Yî of Kâu; that in each of them the regular (or primary) lineal figures were 8, which were multiplied, in each, till the, amounted to 64.'<sup>33</sup>

I Ching divination is a form of cleromancy applied to the I Ching, an ancient Chinese divination text which dates to the Western Zhou period (1000–750 BC). The text of the I Ching consists of sixty-four hexagrams: six-line figures of yin (broken) or yang (solid)

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<sup>30</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 2760). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>31</sup> [Wikipedia on Cleromancy](#)

<sup>32</sup> "Introduction to Runes". [Sunnyway.com](#). 2013-06-02.

<sup>33</sup> Legge, James. I Ching: With Linked Table of Contents (Kindle Locations 114-117). Dancing Unicorn Books.

lines, and commentaries on them. There are two main methods of building up the lines of the [hexagram](#), using either 50 yarrow stalks or three coins. Some of the lines may be designated "old" lines, in which case the lines are subsequently changed to create a second hexagram. The text relating to the hexagram(s) and old lines (if any) is studied, and the meanings derived from such study can be interpreted as an oracle.<sup>34</sup>

1. Having described the Yî King as consisting of a text in explanation of certain lineal figures, and of appendixes to it, and having traced the composition of the former to its authors in the twelfth century B. C., and that of the latter to between six and seven centuries later at least, I proceed to give an account of what we find in the Text, and how it is deduced from the figures. The subject-matter of the Text may be briefly represented The Yî consists of essays based on lineal figures as consisting of sixty-four short essays, enigmatically and symbolically expressed, on important themes, mostly of a moral, social, and political character, and based on the same number of lineal figures, each made up of six lines, some of which are whole and the others divided.<sup>35</sup>

Wen is said to have received a [Mandate of Heaven](#) which is the belief that calamities, ill omens, signal the time for a new leader. "If the sovereign was insufficiently virtuous, Heaven would choose a new successor, portended by various omens or disasters."<sup>36</sup>

In 1059 B.C.E., two unusual celestial phenomena took place. In May, the densest clustering in five hundred years' time of the five planets visible to the naked eye could be seen in the constellation of Cancer, followed a few seasons later by an apparition of Comet 1P/Halley.[12]:123–124, 129 One or more of these[13]:38 was interpreted by King Wen as a visible sign indicating his divine appointment.[14]:30–31 Early records, such as the inscription on the Da Yu ding, describe Heaven's Mandate in terms of an actual astronomic event: "the great command in the sky" (天有大令).<sup>37</sup>

I like to think of the lord of Kâu, when incarcerated in Yû-lî, with the 64 figures arranged before him. Each hexagram assumed a mystic meaning, and glowed with a deep significance. He made it tell him of the qualities of various objects of nature, or of the principles of human society, or of the condition, actual and possible, of the kingdom. He named the figures, each by a term descriptive of the idea with which he had connected it in his mind, and then he proceeded to set that idea forth, now with a

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<sup>34</sup> [https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/I\\_Ching\\_divination](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Ching_divination)

<sup>35</sup> Legge, James. *I Ching: With Linked Table of Contents* (Kindle Locations 247-254). Dancing Unicorn Books.

<sup>36</sup> [Szczepanski, Kallie \(1 August 2019\). "What Is the Mandate of Heaven in China?". ThoughtCo. Dotdash Meredith](#)

<sup>37</sup> [Allan, Sarah \(2007\). "On the identity of Shang Di 上帝 and the origin of the concept of a Celestial Mandate \(Tian Ming 天命\)". \*Early China\*. 31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1–46.](#)

note of exhortation, now with a note of warning. It was an attempt to restrict the follies of divination within the bounds of reason.<sup>38</sup>

## **The Founders of America on the tendency of democracy to devolve into oligarchy**

The founders were well aware of Aristotle's theory on the cycle of governments, democracy's tendency to become an oligarchy. The founders of America studied the classic philosophers when creating the American system of government.

Several of the Founding Fathers of the United States were influenced by classical political philosophy, including Aristotle's ideas. While they did not directly quote or write extensively about Aristotle's specific theory on the degeneration of democracy into oligarchy, they were familiar with his concepts of government and incorporated elements of his political theory into their own thoughts and writings:

- James Madison, in particular, was well-read in classical political theory. In Federalist No. 10 and Federalist No. 51, he discusses the dangers of factions and the need for a balanced government to prevent the tyranny of the majority or minority. Although he does not explicitly mention Aristotle's cycle of government, his concerns about the instability of pure democracy reflect similar worries. Madison's advocacy for a republic with checks and balances can be seen as an attempt to avoid the pitfalls Aristotle described in his theory where democracies would devolve into oligarchies or other forms of government.
- John Adams wrote extensively about political theory in works like "A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America" where he discusses the balance between different forms of government, echoing Aristotle's classification of regimes. Adams was particularly interested in the idea of a mixed government, which could be interpreted as a solution to prevent the shift from democracy to oligarchy by balancing democratic elements with aristocratic and monarchical ones.
- Thomas Jefferson, although more of a proponent of democratic ideals, also engaged with classical thought. In his letters and writings, he often reflected on the balance of power and the dangers of wealth concentration, which aligns with concerns about oligarchy, though not directly linked to Aristotle's specific cycle theory.

While these founders did not explicitly write about Aristotle's theory of democracy devolving into oligarchy, their works and the structure they envisioned for the

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<sup>38</sup> Legge, James. *I Ching: With Linked Table of Contents* (Kindle Locations 421-425). Dancing Unicorn Books.

American government show an awareness of the need to prevent such transitions through constitutional design and checks and balances.<sup>39</sup>

John Adams extensively goes over Aristotle's forms of government and how Rome used a combination of them. This would [inspire the structure of the new American government](#).

As to the form of government, which is the other part of the animated city, let us say with those wise men who have written of civil dominion and public administration, as Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Plutarch, and others, that the simple forms of good government are three, to which are opposed three other forms of bad government. The first form of good government is monarchy, or kingship, and is the absolute and independent dominion of one man alone, who has for the ultimate end of his operations the public good, and the best state of the city, and who has the same relation to his subjects that the shepherd has to his flock, and the father to his children. Such were the monarchies of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Macedonians, Scythians, Egyptians, and Romans, from the beginning of their reign to the creation of the consuls, and, after the extinction of the Roman republic, under the empire of many Cæsars. To monarchy is opposed that form of government which is called tyranny, in which one lords it alone, who has no thoughts of the public good, but whose aim is to depress and exterminate the citizens, to whom he shows himself a monster, rapacious after their property, and a cruel wild beast after their lives; such were Phalaris in Agrigentum, Dionysius in Syracuse, and Nero in Rome.

The second form of good government is aristocracy, according to which the dominion is held by those who, above all others, are adorned with virtue, prudence, and benevolence; who directing all their actions to the utility and common dignity of the city, procure it a happy and blessed state. This species of government is also called the regimen of the better sort, (optimates,) either because the best men of the city bear rule, or because they look, in all their operations, to the best and most perfect state of the city. This manner of government was used by the Spartans. To this form of government is opposed oligarchy, which is a principality of the most rich and powerful, who, for the most part, are few; who, by depressing and robbing of their property the less rich, and crushing the poor with intolerable weight, make a government full of arrogance and of violence, and are like wolves among lambs. Such was the dominion of the Triumvirs in Rome, who having oppressed the republic, proscribed and put to death many good citizens, and plundered their property; exalting the seditious and

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<sup>39</sup> <https://x.com/i/grok/share/NNGLhneajdwxWR4EuhLnvBV4I>

perverse, and abasing good men, they distempered Rome with their contagious wickedness; and of a city, the capital of the world, they made it a den of robbers.

The third form of good government, not having a proper name, was called by the Greeks *politeia*, and by the Latins, *respublica*, names common to every species of government. This is the dominion of the multitude, namely,—of the whole body of the city, composed of all sorts of citizens, rich and poor, nobles and plebeians, wise and foolish, which is also called a popular government. All this body, which contains men, some endowed with prudence and wisdom, some inclined to virtue and persuadable to all good works, by the conversation and familiarity which they have with the prudent and learned, employ all their care, labor, and industry, to the end that the city flourish in all those things which are necessary and convenient for living well and happily, such as was at one time the government of the Athenians.

To this species of good government is opposed democracy; according to which the most abject plebeians, and the vilest vulgar, hold the domination for their own private interest, by which they oppress the rich and the noble, and aggrandize and enrich the poor and the ignoble, as the two brothers, the Gracchi, began to do in Rome.

Three, therefore, are the simple forms of good government, monarchy, aristocracy, and that which by a common name is called a republic; and from these, mixed together, four others may result. The first is composed of all the three, as was that of the Lacædemonians, instituted by Lycurgus, who, selecting the good from the three former, composed out of them one of the most perfect kind. Such, also, was the Roman republic, in which the power of the consuls was like the regal authority; that of the senate was aristocratic; and that of the people resembled the popular state. The second form of mixed government is composed of monarchy and aristocracy, such as, according to some, is the most serene republic of Venice, in which the annual *podestàs* have a power similar to a regal authority, and the senate are an assembly or collection of the *optimates*; although others contend that it is a perfect aristocracy. The third is a mixture of a monarchy and a republic; and the fourth of a republic and an aristocracy; of which two species of mixed government we have no examples to allege.

But to return to the three simple forms; it is the common opinion of the learned, that monarchy holds the first rank above all others, resembling the power of God Almighty, who alone governs the world; resembling the heart, which alone vivifies all the parts of the animal; and resembling the sun, which alone illuminates the celestial bodies, as well as the lower world. It is very true, that to a monarchy ought to be elevated only that citizen, according to the philosopher, who, exceeding others in the ordinary

course, in riches, wisdom, prudence, and benevolence, is like a god upon earth; such as would be the man who should be adorned with heroic virtue, according to which, performing all the labors of virtue in the utmost perfection and supreme excellency, he would appear to be not the son of a mortal,† but of God. But it being impossible, or at least most difficult, to find a man so rare, it has happened, that, laying aside monarchy, the philosophers have disputed which of the other two forms of good government is better accommodated, more practicable, and more profitable, for the regimen of cities and of peoples. Some were of opinion that this praise was due to an aristocracy; nevertheless Aristotle confuses them, because in the aristocratic government the magistracies and the honors being always in the hands of a few, there is great danger that the multitude, perpetually excluded from public management, should be tumultuous, and conspire against the lives of the principal men, to the great damage of the whole city; because in these revolts the force and violence of the people regard friends no more than enemies; it is mad, and most horribly pillages, murders, and abuses, all that comes in its way. It remains, then, that the third species of good government, which is the popular government, in which the citizens alternately command and obey, must be the most useful, and better adjusted to the nature of man, in whose soul the Divinity has stamped the desire of ruling; with such limitations and temperaments, however, as, says the same philosopher, that the vile plebeians may not have magistrates appointed for their ignorance and imprudence, which are the two fountains of all civil calamities; but that the plebeians may not be totally despised, and that all occasion of insurrections may be taken away, power should be given them of joining with the other citizens in the election of magistrates, and of calling them to account for their administration.<sup>40</sup>

## **Alexander Hamilton’s “representative democracy” as an oligarchic practice**

The Founders of America tried to limit democracy’s tendency to move toward oligarchy. They used the separation of powers with the 3 branches of government to limit concentration of power but unfortunately did not make use of selection by lot, other than for juries which makes capture easier.

The American Founders were frank and unapologetic in their denigration of democracy as it was universally and correctly understood up to their time. They did not describe their new constitution as a simple democracy, since it was no such thing. Alexander Hamilton coined a new phrase, "representative democracy," to label the new

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<sup>40</sup> [The Works of John Adams, vol. 5 \(Defence of the Constitutions Vols. II and III\)](#)

form of government the Founders were self-consciously instituting. This linguistic invention marked the beginning of a change in the use of the word democracy, the full transformation occurring over the ensuing century. It now meant, says Wood, "the transfer ['relinquishment,' 'alienation'] of power to 'representatives of the people'.. . [and this was something more than] just a necessary concession to size and complexity." By contrast, "The alienation of political power was so foreign to the Greek conception of democracy that even election could be regarded as an oligarchic practice, one democracies might adopt for certain specific purposes [mainly the selection of generals] but which did not belong to the essence of the democratic constitution.... Election was understood to favor.. . the notables; men of property and good birth.... The quintessentially democratic method was selection by lot."<sup>41</sup>

## **What similarities are there in the structure of the American government with the Roman republic?**

The structure of the American government shares several similarities with the Roman Republic, reflecting the influence of Roman political institutions on the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Here are some key similarities:

### 1. Separation of Powers:

- Roman Republic: The Roman government was divided into three primary branches:
  - Senate: Advised on policy and had significant veto power over magistrates.
  - Magistrates (including Consuls and Praetors): Elected officials with executive authority, typically serving for one year.
  - Assemblies: The Comitia Centuriata (assemblies of soldiers based on property ownership), Comitia Tributa (citizens assembled by familial tribe), and Concilium Plebis (Plebeian class citizen assembly), where citizens could vote on laws, elect magistrates, and decide on war and peace.

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<sup>41</sup> THE RACKET AND THE ANSWER: The Representative System and the Democratic Alternative, Ted Aranda, 2010, pg 287




Chart Showing the Checks and Balances of the Constitution of the Roman Republic. Attribution: [CC BY-SA 3.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)

## - United States:

- Legislative Branch: Congress, divided into the Senate and the House of Representatives, mirrors the dual assemblies of Rome by having a bicameral structure.

- Executive Branch: The President, with powers somewhat analogous to the Roman consuls, though without the same limitations like one-year terms or collegiality.

- Judicial Branch: While the Roman Republic did not have a separate judicial branch as distinctly as the U.S. does with the Supreme Court, the Praetors in Rome were responsible for justice administration.

## 2. Checks and Balances:

- Roman Republic: The Senate could veto actions of magistrates, tribunes could veto legislation or Senate decrees, and the assemblies had legislative power.

- United States: Each branch of government has mechanisms to limit the powers of the others, preventing any one branch from gaining dominance, much like the Roman system where power was dispersed to avoid tyranny.

## 3. Term Limits and Collegiality:

- Roman Republic: Consuls served for one year and initially served together as a pair to check each other's power.

- United States: While the President serves for four years with the possibility of re-election once, the idea of limiting executive power over time reflects a similar concern for preventing autocratic rule, akin to the Roman practice.

#### 4. Elections:

- Roman Republic: Magistrates were elected by various assemblies, often in competitive elections.

- United States: Elected officials at various levels of government reflect the principle of popular or representative elections, a key element from the Roman system.

#### 5. Citizenship and Representation:

- Roman Republic: Citizenship was crucial, with different levels of rights depending on the citizen's class or origin. Voting rights were stratified.

- United States: The concept of citizenship rights and representative government is fundamental, though initially, like Rome, these rights were not universally applied across all groups.

#### 6. Veto Power:

- Roman Republic: The tribunes could veto laws, decisions by magistrates, or actions of the Senate, providing a significant check on governmental power.

- United States: The President has veto power over legislation, and the Congress can override this veto with a super majority, reflecting a similar principle of balancing power.

These similarities show how the framers of the U.S. Constitution were influenced by the structure of the Roman Republic, aiming to create a government that would be stable, balanced, and durable while preventing the concentration of power in any single institution or individual.<sup>42</sup>

## On the balance of power

In book 3 of *the Laws by Plato* Megillus and an Athenian discuss seditions which weakened the cohesiveness of the Greek states, inviting invasion by the Persians. Regional kings sought power. Because of this natural tendency of mankind, care must be taken in balancing power.

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<sup>42</sup> <https://x.com/i/grok/share/LMsHn3GY15D6dfESem6chlDio>

... ATHENIAN: That if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess, runs in the one case to disorders, and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power — no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends: when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows: —

MEGILLUS: What?

ATHENIAN: A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. But your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there had been only the original legislators, Temenus, Cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny.<sup>43</sup>

## **Popular election versus aristocracy by lot**

In *Defense of the Constitution*, John Adams quotes from 2 Italian orators who were arguing the benefits of popular election (democracy) versus the aristocracy of Venice (which made use of random selection to prevent factionalism).

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<sup>43</sup> PLATO. *Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated)* (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 3039). Delphi Classics.

It was in this convention, which Nerli calls a parliament, that those elegant speeches which Guicciardini has preserved, or composed, one for Soderini and the other for Vespucci, are supposed to have been made; but it is surprising to see that neither orator, so eloquent and able, nor yet the historian who so elegantly reports the debate, appears to have once thought of the natural and necessary remedy. One is for a government simply popular, and the other for a form simply aristocratic; but neither thinks of an equal mixture of the three forms, nor even of the two; nor does an idea occur of separating the legislative from the executive power. Soderini admits that, “among all writers upon government, praises have been more liberally bestowed upon the administration of a single prince, and upon that of a few of the best citizens, than upon any popular government;” but he thinks that “the desire of liberty is so natural or habitual in that city, and the condition of the citizens so proportioned to that equality which is the necessary foundation of a popular government, that it ought, without any doubt, to be preferred to all others.” He even thinks a question could not be made of this, “as in all their consultations it had ever been determined, with universal consent, that the city should be governed in the name and by the authority of the people. But the diversity of opinions arose from this, that some would cheerfully consent in the regulation of the convention to that form of a republic with which the city governed itself before her liberty was oppressed by the family of the Medici; others, among whom he reckons himself, judging a government so ordered to have, in many things, rather the name than the effects of a popular government, and terrified with the accidents which frequently result from it, desire a more perfect form, which may preserve concord and security to the citizens; blessings which, neither from reason nor experience, can be expected in this city, if it is not under a government dependent entirely on the power of the people. This must, however, be well ordered by two fundamental regulations. The first of these is, that all the magistrates and officers, both in the city and all its dominions, shall be distributed, from time to time, by a universal council of all those who, according to our laws, are qualified for a participation in government; without the approbation of which council new laws cannot be considered. Hence, it not being in the power of private citizens, nor of any particular conspiracy or intrigue, to distribute dignities or authority, none will be excluded from them by the passions or caprice of others, but they shall be bestowed according to the virtues and merits of men. By consequence, every one must endeavor, by his virtues, good manners, and by rendering himself agreeable both in public and private life, to open his way to honors. Every one must abstain from vices and injuries to others, and, in one word, from all those things which are odious in a well-constituted city. It will not be in the power of any one, nor of a few, by new laws,

or by the authority of a magistrate, to introduce another government, or to pretend to alter this, but by the resolution of the universal council.

“The second fundamental regulation is this; that all the most important deliberations, as those of peace and war, the examination of new laws, and generally all those things which are necessary to the administration of such a city and dominion, shall be treated by magistrates particularly destined to this service, in a select council of the most experienced and prudent citizens, who shall be deputed by the popular council; for, as the knowledge of these affairs of state is not found in every understanding, precautions should be taken that the government may not fall into hands incapable of conducting it; and the celerity and secrecy which are often indispensable, cannot be consulted or preserved in the deliberations of a multitude. Neither is it necessary for the maintenance of liberty, that such things should be treated by large numbers; for liberty remains secure at all times when the distribution of magistracies, and the deliberations on new laws, depend on universal consent.

“These two points being secured, the government will be truly popular, the liberty of the city well founded, and a laudable and durable form of a republic established.”

He then compares his project with the plan of Venice,—to which it has not, however, the smallest resemblance,—and proceeds: “This city of ours has never enjoyed a government like this, and therefore our public affairs have been constantly exposed to frequent mutations; at one time trampled down by the violence of tyranny; at another torn by the ambitious and avaricious dissensions of the few; now shaken by the licentious fury of the multitude; and although cities are built for no end but the tranquility, security, and happy life of the inhabitants, the fruits of our government, our felicity, our repose, have been the continual confiscations of our estates, the banishments and the executions on the scaffold, of our miserable citizens.”

This is the substance of Soderini’s oration, in which he is fully sensible of the tyranny and slavery of alternate factions, and the consequent miseries with which the history of Florence is filled; but, instead of proposing a rational remedy, he is for aggravating the evil. The executive power, the appointment of officers, had been the cause of discord. He now only proposes to give those appointments to the multitude, instead of

a senate; to the universal, instead of the particular council; the only effect of which would be that more heads would be turned, and more passions inflamed.

The oration of Soderini was answered by Vespucci, a famous lawyer, and a man of singular genius and address. "If," says he, "a government, instituted in the manner proposed by Soderini, most excellent citizens, would produce such desirable fruits with the same ease that they may be described, he would certainly discover a most corrupted character who should wish any other for the regulation of our country. He would be a most pernicious citizen, who should not love, without reservation, a form of republic, in which virtue, merit, and the real value of men, should be above all things acknowledged and honored. But I confess myself ignorant how it is possible to hope that a government, placed absolutely in the power of the people, can be productive of such mighty blessings. On the contrary, I well know, what reason teaches, experience demonstrates, and the authority of the greatest lawgivers confirms, that, in so great a multitude, there can never be found such prudence, such experience, and such order, as may give us room to promise ourselves the wise will be preferred to the ignorant, the good to the bad, or men of experience to those who have never seen a public transaction. For as, from an incapable and unskillful judge, it is not possible to hope for a sagacious sentence, so, from a people immersed in ignorance and involved in confusion, we cannot expect, unless by accident, prudent deliberations or rational elections. Can we believe that a multitude, inexpert, unskillful, compounded of so great a variety of geniuses, conditions, and customs, and wholly devoted to their private affairs, can possibly distinguish and know those intricate interests and duties of the public, which men of the most consummate wisdom, who are wholly inattentive to any other business, are often with great difficulty able to discern? Not to mention, that the unbounded esteem which every one entertains of himself, will stimulate them all to become ambitious of honors, it will never be satisfactory to men in a popular government to enjoy the honest fruits of liberty, but all will aspire to the highest rank, and be impatient to intermeddle in deliberations upon affairs of the most importance and greatest difficulty. For among us there is less than in any other city in the world of that modesty which yields the precedence to him who has more knowledge or more merit. Persuading ourselves, as we do, that, in reason and by right, we ought all of us to be equal in all things, the places of virtue and merit, if left in the disposition of the multitude, will be confounded; and this ambition, being diffused through the majority, will designedly bestow the most power on the most ignorant and the least meritorious; because, being by much the most numerous,


they will have the most influence in a state so constituted that opinions in it are numbered and not weighed. What certainty, therefore, can you have that, although they may be satisfied with the form that you introduce at present, they will not presently disarrange the institutions the most wisely concerted, by their novel inventions and imprudent laws? And these the wisest citizens will not be able to resist. These things, at all times dangerous in such a government, will be much more so at present, because it is the nature of mankind, when they fly from one extreme, in which they have been held by violence, to rush with greater violence, without stopping at the mean, to the other extremity. Thus, he who escapes from a tyranny, if unrestrained, precipitates himself into an unbridled licentiousness, which also may most justly be called a tyranny; for a people is exactly like a tyrant, when they give to him who has no merit, and take away from him who has much; when they confound all gradations and distinctions of persons; and their tyranny is perhaps so much the more pestiferous, as ignorance, which has no weights, nor measures, nor laws, is more dangerous even than malignity, which does govern itself by some rule, restrain itself by some bridle, and satisfy itself with some end...

“Has this city ever been under the absolute government of the people, without becoming an instant prey to discord, without being shaken to its foundation, and without suffering an immediate revolution in the state? Why are not our liberties secure under the government proposed in this parliament? All things refer to the disposition of magistrates, who are not perpetual, but are frequently changed; who are not elected by a few, but, having been approved by many, are appointed, according to the ancient usage of the city, by lot. How then can they be appointed by factions, or by the will of particular citizens? We shall have a much greater certainty that affairs of the most importance will be examined and directed by men of the most wisdom, experience, and gravity, who will govern with more order, secrecy, and maturity of judgment, than it is possible for a people, who are incapable of such things, to possess; a people, who are often, when there is little occasion for it, most extravagantly splendid and expensive; and oftener still, when there is the most urgent necessity, so penurious and niggardly, as to rush upon the greatest dangers and expenses, for the sake of saving the most trifling sums.”

In truth, both these speeches, with all their eloquence, were thrown away. Soderini was for collecting “all authority into one centre,” the people; and Vespucci into another, the senate. Neither dared propose a separation of the executive from both, in a first magistrate; and without that, and admitting both the senate and people to a

share, there could be no peace nor harmony in Florence. The question, however, was not decided by the logic or rhetoric of either. Few of the citizens attended the convention, and the vote would have been for the aristocracy of Vespucci, if another orator had not intervened.<sup>44</sup>

## The use of sortition in Florence and Venice as a way to limit the game of thrones elite intrigues and power struggles



There was the system of the “scrutiny” in which officials were randomly selected from a pool which was made of people selected by the aristocracy. It was a response to fighting amongst the noble houses. Using the “scrutiny” method they could keep control within the aristocracy without the struggles for control.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> [The Works of John Adams, Vol 5](#)

<sup>45</sup> <https://counter-currents.com/2013/06/lot-in-florence/>

In Venice the selection of the doge by sortition reduced rivalries between the family dynasties. Members of the Great Council were reduced in successive rounds to narrow the pool of members who would elect a new doge.

"New regulations for the elections of the doge introduced in 1268 remained in force until the end of the republic in 1797. Their intention was to minimize the influence of individual great families, and this was effected by a complex electoral machinery. Thirty members of the Great Council, chosen by lot, were reduced by lot to nine; the nine chose forty and the forty were reduced by lot to twelve, who chose twenty-five. The twenty-five were reduced by lot to nine, and the nine elected forty-five. These forty-five were once more reduced by lot to eleven, and the eleven finally chose the forty-one who elected the doge."<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> [Chisholm, Hugh, ed. \(1911\). "Doge". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 8 \(11th ed.\). Cambridge University Press. pp. 379–380.](#)

# Modern democracies

## Measuring democracy – how democratic are modern self-proclaimed democracies?

Politicians proclaim the virtues of democracy, that it shares representation and is participatory, but what has been the result? Is power actually spread among the people? Do people feel they are participating and how many participate? How informed are the average voter?

After researching how modern democracies or representative republics operate you will see they are at best oligarchies (rule by the few) or at worst kleptocracies (rule by thieves).

Resources for this section:

[In 2020, 66.8% of the citizen voting-age population voted in the presidential election. The highest turnout in more than a century. The percentage has been increasing since 1980.](#)

Enfranchisement reduced the percentage of voter participation. “as the number of people eligible to vote increased, the turnout rate generally decreased.”<sup>47</sup>

[80 percent of voters don't participate in primary elections.](#)

[After the 2020 Census, the average population of the country's House districts was 761,169.](#)

[In the 2020 election, 43.1% of votes were cast by mail.](#)

[Racial, class and sex differences in Voter's knowledge of issues](#)

“The average voter is often too preoccupied with the demands of daily life to pay attention to the intricacies of a campaign”, so voters rely on heuristics, i.e., voting for a party or for a candidate based on racial identity.<sup>48</sup>

The convergence of these factors make the modern so-called democracies de facto oligarchies and kleptocracies. These factors include captured political party domination (the 2 party system particularly in America), low turnout in primary elections, uninformed voters relying on media coverage for information which is often designed to mislead, financial control of candidates by donors, apathy of the public, interference in elections via ballot harvesting and in some cases, mail in voting.

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<sup>47</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1139251/voter-turnout-in-us-presidential-and-midterm-elections/>

<sup>48</sup> <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-018-9512-2>

## How do these factors come together to create an oligarchy/kleptocracy?

People can only think and act on what they know. Media sources are captured and consolidated. Intelligence services in some cases directly or indirectly through NGO proxies<sup>49</sup>, steer news stories and pressure media companies to censor exposing them. Add to the control of information the research done on animal behavior control methods, [subliminal messaging](#) and emotional manipulation techniques perfected in the 20<sup>th</sup> century by psychological researchers and advertisers, for example the work done by the nephew of Sigmund Freud, [Edward Bernays](#).

Having control over the media and government messaging allows for the steering of people into what you want them to think about, ie narrative control. This relates to “Trump derangement syndrome” (TDS) which is the realization of what George Orwell envisioned in 1984 with the 2 minutes of hate, where each morning the people would be assembled to be shown propaganda about a villain to direct their hate towards. Democrat voters admit that they aren’t voting in support of a candidate, they are voting against Trump. Evidence of this in the form of [polls](#) reveal that most Kamala Harris supporters do not know the policies which she supports.

An example of democracy undermining by hiding information was the cover up of Hunter Biden’s laptop scandal. This was a cooperative effort from the government, including intelligence officials who dismissed the story as being Russian disinformation. The [DOJ and FBI](#) also helped cover it up. The freedom of information request on this information was [stalled for 3 years](#) until coincidentally the week that Biden dropped out of running for reelection.

## Examples of democracy spreading that America funds around the World. How really “democratic” are these governments?

Very questionable “democracies” like [Egypt](#) and monarchies/dictatorships like Jordan get funding from the US as essentially a bribe for the advantage of Israel. The idea of fighting for democracy is a sham excuse as they are just as likely to support an autocracy when convenient. For example Ukraine’s regime came to power by a coup and recently suspended elections, not very democratic and yet is receiving billions in aid. Democracy when it is convenient. Or more precisely as cover to operate clandestinely to capture nations.

The only democracy on the list below of the top recipients of foreign aid, Israel has

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<sup>49</sup> [Mike Benz exposes that USAID was used to censor Americans.](#)

undermined America's entire political and economic structures and has [bot farm companies which work to undermine elections in other countries](#). Not a shining example of democracy.

In 2023, the United States spent nearly \$61 billion on foreign aid. Fully half of that budget has gone to just ten countries:

Ukraine (\$16.4 billion)  
Israel (\$3.3 billion)  
Ethiopia (\$1.95 billion)  
Jordan (\$1.65 billion)  
Egypt (\$1.43 billion)  
Afghanistan (\$1.19 billion)  
Somalia (\$1.13 billion)  
Yemen (\$1.05 billion)  
Congo (\$987 million)  
Syria (\$896 million)<sup>50</sup>

[Ethiopia](#) – 20/100. “Despite improvements, the (2021) elections were fraught with insecurity, registration problems, and other challenges that limited widespread acceptance of the outcomes. Numerous political parties raised concerns about the closure of their offices by security agents, harassment, imprisonment, and killings of their members.”<sup>51</sup>

Somalia – 8/100. “No direct national elections have been held to date, and political affairs remain dominated by clan divisions.”<sup>52</sup> [NEW REPORT: Election Manipulation and Armed Conflict Drove 18th Consecutive Year of Decline in Freedom](#)

Yemen – 10/100. “Presidential and legislative elections are now many years overdue, and no side in the civil war has been willing or able to implement any electoral framework in the areas under their control.”<sup>53</sup>

Congo – 17/100. “President Denis Sassou Nguesso has maintained nearly uninterrupted power for over 40 years by severely repressing the opposition.”<sup>5</sup> “Political groupings exist, but the government represses those not aligned with the PCT, including by persecuting their leaders.”<sup>54</sup>

Often the spread of democracy is used as a front for regime change and government capturing operations, an example being the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). A quick look at the [FDD Team](#) causes one to find an interesting coincidence. 80%+ of the team are Zionist, so there is an obvious conflict of interest to use the American military as Israel's belligerent enforcer.

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<sup>50</sup> [Foreign aid by country: Who's getting the most – and how much? - ConcernUSA](#)

<sup>51</sup> [Freedom House – Freedom in the World - Ethiopia](#)

<sup>52</sup> [Freedom House – Somalia 2024](#)

<sup>53</sup> [Freedom House – Yemen 2024](#)

<sup>54</sup> [Freedom House – Congo 2024](#)

There is a labyrinthine web of “[democracy promoting](#)” NGOs which are funded by the American taxpayer, to the tune of over \$2 billion per year. Many NGOs also serve as a retirement system for [many former politicians](#), coming from [both political parties](#). This is kleptocracy. A system rewarding large grants and salaries to itself.

# Sortition and Randvicracy

The benefits of random selection:

- blocks interest groups from putting forward controlled candidates due to the uncertainty of control that they will be selected.
- Less likely to appoint those who seek to profit by selling favors of their office, i.e., career politicians, while representative democracy *selects for those who do*.
- Shows impartiality and fairness to all citizens/participants, no favorites or us/them distinction among citizens. No class privileges.
- Makes nepotism very difficult.

## Is random selection rarely used due to the risk of incompetency?

People have a natural tendency to form hierarchies. Sortition is antithetical to this because under random selection hierarchies cannot form. The uncertainty of random selection makes people doubt the efficiency of the method. Randviscracy uses pretesting and weighting of candidates based on IQ and experience to ensure competence.

An example of this skepticism goes back to Aristotle. His primary concern about selection by lot was the potential for incompetence.

But, said the accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established law by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or flutist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft.<sup>55</sup>

Benjamin Barber argues in his book *Strong Democracy* for sortition only to be used in a narrow, limited manner because of the incompetency problem, specifically in local offices where expertise is not required and in local neighborhood assemblies. I disagree because the use of weights in the selection can ensure qualified candidates.

## How to ensure competence?

Rousseau proposes in *Considerations for the Government of Poland* using a system of selecting 3 candidates from the palatines (regional leaders) by lot for King. He states the

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<sup>55</sup> Memorabilia, 1.2.9, translation by Marchant (1923, repr. 1968).

benefits of random selection in preventing fraud and limiting the susceptibility to bribery(venality).

In the first place, the use of the lot immediately frustrates the factions and intrigues of foreign nations, which cannot influence this election, being too uncertain of success to devote much effort to it, since even fraud would be insufficient to favour a subject whom the nation can always reject. The greatness of this advantage alone is such that it ensures the peace of Poland, stifles venality in the republic, and leaves the election with almost all the tranquility of hereditary succession.<sup>56</sup>

By having selection open to all the regional leaders, it gives incentive for them all to keep up their best efforts because they may be selected to be part of the 3 finalists in competition for King.

I do not intend, however, that even as between life senators the lot alone should determine the preference; this would still fail in part to achieve the great purpose which ought to be kept in mind. It is necessary that the lot should do something, and that choice should do a great deal, in order, on the one hand, to frustrate the intrigues and manoeuvres of foreign powers and, on the other hand, to give all the palatines this very great motive not to allow their conduct to grow slack, but to continue serving their country zealously, that they may deserve the preference over their competitors.

He also gives the reasons for also including a selection component.

The free choice of the nation between three candidates saves it from the disadvantages of the lot, which might conceivably light on an unworthy person. For if this should happen, the nation will be careful not to choose him; and among thirty-three illustrious men, the elite of the nation, among whom it is inconceivable that there should be even one unworthy person, it is impossible that the three favoured by the lot should all be unworthy.

Prevents nepotism. Not heredity. It is inclusive. Again, preselected candidates for quality control.

For in the first place, since the crown does not pass from father to son, there will never be any continuous and systematic attempt to enslave the republic. In the second place, the lot itself, in this form, is the instrument of an informed and voluntary election. From the estimable corps of law guardians, and among the palatines who are selected

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<sup>56</sup> Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Delphi Collected Works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Illustrated) (Delphi Series Eight Book 18). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

from it, no choice whatsoever can be made that has not already been made by the nation.<sup>57</sup>

Complete chance doesn't make sense but by filtering the candidate pool you can get the benefits of random selection while maximizing the quality of candidates.

The most extreme democracy of modern times has never thought of leaving government wholly to chance. It was natural that Socrates should scoff at it, and ask, 'Who would choose a pilot or carpenter or flute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem.)? Yet there were many considerations which made this mode of choice attractive both to the oligarch and to the democrat: — (1) It seemed to recognize that one man was as good as another, and that all the members of the governing body, whether few or many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word. (2) To the pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven (compare Laws). (3) It afforded protection against corruption and intrigue...It must also be remembered that, although elected by lot, the persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered on their office, and were therefore liable, after election, if disqualified, to be rejected (Laws). They were, moreover, liable to be called to account after the expiration of their office. In the election of councilors Plato introduces a further check: they are not to be chosen directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body previously elected by vote. In Plato's state at least, as we may infer from his silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed their duties without pay, which was a guarantee both of their disinterestedness and of their belonging probably to the higher class of citizens (compare Arist. Pol.). Hence we are not surprised that the use of the lot prevailed, not only in the election of the Athenian Council, but also in many oligarchies, and even in Plato's colony. The evil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if the magistrates so elected do not, like the dicasts at Athens, receive pay from the state.<sup>58</sup>

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in *The Social Contract* points out the need for selection criteria in positions in which knowledge and experience are needed.

Election by lot would have few disadvantages in a real democracy, in which, as equality would everywhere exist in morals and talents as well as in principles and fortunes, it would become almost a matter of indifference who was chosen. But I have already said that a real democracy is only an ideal. When choice and lot are combined, positions that require special talents, such as military posts, should be filled by the former; the

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<sup>57</sup> Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Delphi Collected Works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Illustrated) (Delphi Series Eight Book 18). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>58</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (pp. 2935-2936). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

latter does for cases, such as judicial offices, in which good sense, justice, and integrity are enough, because in a State that is well constituted, these qualities are common to all the citizens.<sup>59</sup>

Rousseau also discusses Increasing the probability of a good candidate being selected by increasing the quality of the candidate pool.

For if you say, ‘What assurance is there that a king chosen by lot will have the qualities needed to fill the office worthily?’ you are raising an objection I have already met; since it is sufficient for this purpose to provide that the king can only be drawn from the life senators. For, considering that they themselves will be drawn from the order of law guardians, and will have passed with honour through all the grades of the republic, the evidence of their whole lives, and the public approbation they have received in all the positions they have filled, will be sufficient guarantee of the merit and virtue of every one of them.<sup>60</sup>

## **Special interest versus the public interest**

It is possible to use mathematics and game theory to prove random selection is beneficial in parliament member selection. If the starting point is that members will be self-interested and political parties will also work in the group’s self-interest, then it is in the public’s best interest that no group gains a majority to the point where it functions autocratically.

In *The fallacy of representative democracy and the random selection of legislators*, the authors studied the ratios that would provide the greatest “efficiency of a parliamentary institution”. They found that the greater the gap in size of 2 political parties, the more randomly selected members there should be in order to maximize the social benefit of voting, i.e., the least captured outcomes.

“We study a prototypical model of a Parliament with two Parties or two Political Coalitions and we show how the introduction of a variable percentage of randomly selected independent legislators can increase the global efficiency of a Legislature, in terms of both number of laws passed and average social welfare obtained. We also analytically find an “efficiency golden rule” which allows to fix the optimal number of legislators to be selected at random after regular elections have established the relative proportion of the two Parties or Coalitions. These results are in line with both

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<sup>59</sup> Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Delphi Collected Works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Illustrated) (Delphi Series Eight Book 18). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>60</sup> Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Delphi Collected Works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Illustrated) (Delphi Series Eight Book 18). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

the ancient Greek democratic system and the recent discovery that the adoption of random strategies can improve the efficiency of hierarchical organizations.... [We] think that the introduction of random selection systems, rediscovering the wisdom of ancient democracies, would be broadly beneficial for modern institutions.”<sup>61</sup>

## **Study finds the benefits of random selection in promotion**

A study on different promotion methods included random selection, thinking it would end up the worst method, but it turned out to be the best. The reason is because promotions are so susceptible to influence. Personal influence through relationships, bias, nepotism, social skills over work ability. This results in what is called “The Peter Principle”, people move up the ranks until they are inevitably in a position which they aren’t competent at.

In the late sixties the Canadian psychologist Laurence J. Peter advanced the apparently paradoxical principle which can be summarized as follows: 'Every new member in a hierarchical organization climbs the hierarchy until he reaches his level of maximum incompetence'. Despite its apparent unreasonableness, such a principle would realistically act in any organization where the way of promotion rewards the best members and where the competence at their new level in the hierarchical structure does not depend on the competence they had at the previous level, usually because the tasks of the levels are very different between each other.

[This applet](#), realized with NetLogo, shows that if the latter two features actually hold in a given model of an organization with a hierarchical structure, then not only the 'Peter principle' is unavoidable, but it yields in turn a significant reduction of the global efficiency of the organization.<sup>62</sup>

They received an [Ig Nobel prize for their research in 2010](#).

Phelan and Lin aimed to see whether, over the long haul, it pays best to promote people on supposed merit (we try, one way or another, to measure how good you are), or on an "up or out" basis (either you get promoted quickly or you get the boot), or by seniority (live long and by that measure alone you will prosper). As a benchmark, a this-is-as-bad-as-it-could-possibly-get alternative, they also looked at what happens when you promote people at random. They got a surprise: random promotion, they

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<sup>61</sup> [Accidental Politicians: How Randomly Selected Legislators Can Improve Parliament Efficiency. A.Pluchino, C.Garofalo, A.Rapisarda, S.Spagano, M.Caserta](#)

<sup>62</sup> [Who should you promote to improve the efficiency of your organization?](#)

admitted, performed better than almost every alternative. Phelan and Lin seemed (at least in my reading of their 25-page-long paper) almost shocked by what they found.<sup>65</sup>

## **Equality before the law vs equality of outcome. Why add weights to random selection?**

Equality before the law and the inequality of born talents and merit.

Those who have been measurably gifted by having a high IQ and have demonstrated their value through application over time (experience and lack of criminal record) are natural criteria to use for weighting random selection. Weighted selection rather than a completely random sampling of the population.

The old saying, that ‘equality makes friendship,’ is happy and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours: this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized. This is the judgment of Zeus; among men it avails but little; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. To this the legislator should look, — not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to justice always; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural equality among unequals in each case.

But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, ‘just,’ ‘equal,’ in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people; and so we invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice. And therefore,

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<sup>65</sup> [Random promotion may be best, research suggests.](#) Marc Abrahams

although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible.<sup>64</sup>

The use of random selection prevents factions from gaining control through nepotism/favoritism in order to benefit their faction at the expense of others, which can lead to conflict. By prefiltering the selection pool and weighing the selection by IQ and merit, the randomization is minimized to the part that matters the most, *the final selection from qualified candidates in order to block institutional capture*. The filtering is also set up to be measurable to avoid gaming of the process.

An example of institutional capture is called the “revolving door”. This is when politicians go to work for, or previously worked for companies whom they are in charge of regulating. “Between 2006 and 2019, 9 out of 10 FDA commissioners went on to work for the pharmaceutical companies they were in charge of regulating. Approximately 65% of the FDA’s drug review budget comes directly from the pharmaceutical industry.”<sup>65</sup>

Samuel Bragg in the [American Journal of Political Science](#) puts forward the use of sortition for this very reason, to block institutional capture.

The real democratic promise of sortition-based reforms, I argue, lies in obstructing elite capture at critical junctures: a narrower task of oversight that creates fewer opportunities for elite manipulation. In such contexts, the benefits of empowering ordinary people—resulting from their immunity to certain distorting influences on career officials—plausibly outweigh the risks.

Samuel proposes the use of fully lottocratic random selection to create oversight committees rather than legislation-creating entities.

Nearly every popular text on sortition proclaims lotteries as the forgotten radical core of our democratic heritage. Scorned by the elitist architects of modern representative government, sortition promises to make democracy great again—returning us to its Athenian roots and enabling more authentic representation of the will of the people. Though typically shorter on drama, meanwhile, scholarly work often conveys a similar spirit.

Against this backdrop, the anti-corruption model certainly takes some of the romance out of the idea of sortition. Nevertheless, the apparent radicalism of fully lottocratic

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<sup>64</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (pp. 3112-3113). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>65</sup> <https://x.com/KanekoaTheGreat/status/1854949134333362403>

models does not necessarily translate into superior democratic potential. The problem identified by advocates of such radical solutions—that public institutions have been corrupted by distant and self-serving elites—is all too real. Yet as I have argued, ordinary people can contest this pervasive capture most effectively if they are given a task they can perform as ordinary people, with the knowledge and skills they already possess (or can acquire relatively quickly). As such, the appropriate mandate for randomly selected citizens is not legislation but oversight: that is, screening particular decisions for signs of capture or corruption. On this model, radical shifts in the balance of power will emerge not from a dramatic refashioning of popular sovereignty, but from the cumulative impact of many small but enduring institutions, each chipping away at the outsized influence of wealthy and concentrated interests.<sup>66</sup>

Lottocratically-selected (meaning random selection from the entire population without weights) oversight would help reduce corruption but I propose cutting out the middleman and using random selection with weights to select expert panels. The panel would then consist of members who are experienced in the field related to the case and would have more knowledge to correct the other panel members rather than having a civilian who is not familiar with the subject potentially interfering with the case.

## **Plato's Cave. What are the properties of a good statesman?**

Plato/Socrates's cave represents a man-made reality. Outside the cave is the truth which is objective, logical reality.

A person first encountering the truth may not comprehend it due to their incomprehension, their mind's eye being in darkness their whole lives.

When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.<sup>67</sup>

Just as a person can be brought to light, they can be brought to darkness (falsehood). Brainwashing can take a person from reality to fantasy. To believe the shadow on the wall is real. A social puppet show.

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<sup>66</sup> [Sortition as Anti-Corruption: Popular Oversight against Elite Capture](#)

<sup>67</sup> PLATO. *Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated)* (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 1453). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

And must there not be some art which will affect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

## About the intelligence quotient (IQ)

People may find the idea of using IQ as a weighting factor for selection into government too elitist, it certainly isn't the most popular idea. Here is a quote by one of the intellectuals who invented elite theory, Robert Michels.

A party of the landed gentry which should appeal only to the members of its own class and to those of identical economic interests, would not win a single seat, would not send a single representative to parliament. A conservative candidate who should present himself to his electors by declaring to them that he did not regard them as capable of playing an active part in influencing the destinies of the country, and should tell them that for this reason they ought to be deprived of the suffrage, would be a man of incomparable sincerity, but politically insane.

So while this may not be the most popular idea, I believe it is a valuable measurement for selecting policy makers and judges.

Intelligence is the ability to comprehend, to understand and profit from experience. The innate ability to learn, in other words see with the mind's eye. In people there is an innate ability to learn, when measured, this is revealed by the IQ scoring. In randviscracy, IQ is one of 2 metrics which adds weight to the chance of a person being selected for a government panel.

Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good. <sup>68</sup>

Learning to make decisions for the empowerment of the nation. Mastering their craft and committing it to memory.

Socrates and Glaucon often mention “passing from becoming into truth and being”, meaning going from vision (idea) to reality.

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<sup>68</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 1456). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

...we must endeavor to persuade those who are prescribed to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

## **The National Merit Scholarship Program**

There are no universities using the National Merit Scholarship Program, which seeks out the top 0.5% of the highest IQ students.

### **Experience. Wisdom. The dual nature of intelligence.**

In a democracy the 2<sup>nd</sup> metric for weighing the odds of a person being selected is experience. Socrates and Glaucon discuss innate intelligence, “a divine element which always remains”, which can be a force for good or evil.

And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue — how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness.

## **Why weighted selection is important**

If a percentage of the population is rational, it is better to use them for voting/law making than the whole population including the irrational, to prevent poor decision making.

The benefits of the method of selection in a democracy brings:

1. The randomization prevents power seekers from buying access.
2. Weighting by IQ increases the proportion of intelligent panel members.

3. Weighing by experience increases the proportion of the knowledgeable and aged. Many governments put an arbitrary age limit for example Athens had a 50 year old minimum for magistrate examiners for this reason.

## The Weighted Airman Promotion System

The US Air Force uses a weighted selection process for promoting airmen to ensure qualified candidates. The candidates are evaluated based on test scores and experience. They don't use randomization but I include this as a real world proven/tested example of using both test scores and time of experience as metrics for weighted selection.

Since 1970, the Air Force has promoted individuals to E5–E7 using a formula that does not involve inputs from selection boards. Each eligible airman earns a weighted score that is a function of Enlisted Performance Report (EPR) scores, decorations, score on the annual Promotion Fitness Exam (PFE), score on the annual Specialty Knowledge Test (SKT), time in service (TIS), and time in grade (TIG).<sup>2</sup> Selection to E8 and E9 has an additional component —a board score. Each of these factors carries different point values that in 1970 reflected the importance that board members placed on that factor.

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## Voluntarily service for good alignment

Selection should be voluntary and have qualifications to ensure good candidates. These principals were proposed by Montesquieu for democracy.

“The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy; as that by choice is to aristocracy. The suffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one, but animates each citizen with the pleasing hope of serving his country.

Yet as this method is in itself defective, it has been the endeavor of the most eminent legislators to regulate and amend it.

Solon made a law at Athens that military employment should be conferred by choice; but that senators and judges should be elected by lot.

The same legislator ordained that civil magistracies, attended with great expense, should be given by choice, and the others by lot.

In order, however, to amend the suffrage by lot, he made a rule that none but those who presented themselves should be elected; that the person elected should be

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<sup>69</sup> [The Weighted Airman Promotion System. Standardizing Test Scores. Rand Corporation.](#)

examined by judges, and that everyone should have a right to accuse him if he were unworthy of the office; this participated at the same time of the suffrage by lot and of that by choice. When the time of their magistracy had expired, they were obliged to submit to another judgment in regard to their conduct. Persons utterly unqualified must have been extremely backward in giving in their names to be drawn by lot.” - [Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. 2, CH. 2](#)

“Until about two hundred years ago it was widely assumed that the principle of rotation of offices by lot was the characteristic procedure of democracy.” – John Burnheim.<sup>70</sup>

Because the random panel members are not invested into a political machine, political party or interest group they would be more willing to speak out or oppose subversion of the process.

In the book, *Is Democracy Possible*, the author, John Burnheim proposes in order to get knowledgeable or skilled candidates by creating a pool of candidates by vote, like the Venetian system of “scrutiny”. There would need to be separation or the nomination process would turn into an election. Susceptible to vote harvesting, media campaigning, bribery, favors, etc.

“Even if the requirement of consent is restricted to decision procedures rather than extended to specific decisions, no group would consent freely and rationally to decision procedures that would undermine its vital interests.”<sup>71</sup>

Further examples of interest groups: Parasitical polities will block the restriction of their rent-seeking. There is also the issue of multiculturalism within a democracy. Groups will vote for their interests. Then there is women’s suffrage turning women into a voting block, splitting the family. No longer 1 house, 1 vote. Women tend to favor consumption and competition among men, thus they want open borders instinctively. History shows that [during foreign invasions it is women who still pass on their DNA while the local men do not as they are killed by the invaders](#). This creates opposing interests on immigration between men and women.

Sortition creates better incentives for candidates than those in representative democracy. A very different type of candidate will be selected for, due to the different selection mechanism. An entry process of volunteering for and serving in jury duty versus political battle for control. Popularity contests and the need for campaign funds under representative democracy. While under randviscracy, a selection for work/volunteer experience and score on the IQ test. It is obvious the Randviscratic filtering method would select for far less corruptible types of people.

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<sup>70</sup> Burnheim, John. *Is democracy possible?: the alternative to electoral politics* (p. 17). Sydney University Press. Kindle Edition.

<sup>71</sup> Burnheim, John. *Is democracy possible?: the alternative to electoral politics* (p. 18). Sydney University Press. Kindle Edition.

“The great virtue of demarchy in this respect is that it abolishes the distinction between centre and periphery. Every matter is dealt with in specific terms, not in terms of generalities that cannot reflect its importance to those involved.”<sup>72</sup>

Panel members in randviscracy will deal directly with each case, using people with experience in the related field.

Socrates suggested that government officials should neither be uneducated nor scholarly. Officials should be from a separate class, not floating above the hive, outside of the state's zeitgeist. In randviscracy, statesmen are drawn temporarily from the populace and are pre-certified in logical and reciprocal judgment.

## **No career politicians**

Elective politics creates a selection pressure for cutthroat competitiveness, often with use of intrigue, tactics of leverage and underhanded methods to rise to the top. A study on animal behavior showed that selecting for the most aggressive can have disastrous results.

Elections are often regarded as a way to get the best among us together to solve the problems of society. But this conception is, to say the least, problematic — for reasons set forth memorably by Margaret Heffernan, a professor of management at the University of Bath, whose interest in productivity drew her to the work of the evolutionary biologist William Muir. He studied hens, because it is so easy to measure their productivity (you simply count the eggs). To determine what might make hens more productive, Muir devised an experiment: he selected an average flock and let it alone for six generations but also separated out the individually most productive chickens and put them together in a super flock. In each successive generation, he selected only the most productive for breeding. After six more generations had passed, he found that the first group, the average group, was doing well. The hens were all plump and fully feathered, and their egg production had increased dramatically. In the super flock, however, all but three hens were dead. The three had pecked the rest to death. The individually productive chickens had achieved their success by suppressing the productivity of the others. As Heffernan observes, most organizations and some societies are run in accordance with this super flock model, on the assumption that success is achieved by picking superstars and giving them all the resources and power. The result has been the same as in Muir's experiment: aggression, dysfunction, and waste.<sup>73</sup>

“The most important guarantee of liberty”, the first-century BC Roman historian Livy

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<sup>72</sup> [ibid](#)

<sup>73</sup> [IGNORANCE, IRRATIONALITY, ELECTIONS, AND SORTITION, Terrill G. Bouricius, pg 208](#)

makes one of his characters say, “is for great offices to be of brief tenure and for limits of time to be imposed where limits of jurisdiction cannot be.”<sup>74</sup>

Randviscracy takes shortening terms to the extreme of having every law being authorized by a newly-created panel.

I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not. But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better? You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

Instruments in binding up the state. The system of constantly selecting new panelists, having the ability for reviews and hidden observers among the panelists will prevent internal corruption.

Educated to be above drones (drones are what Plato calls the managerial class, the nepotistic and consumer, a low-level elite class). Randviscracy makes governing into jury duty. A reluctant ruler is best and the most eager to rule the worst.

But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get in the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

Randviscracy has panel members who are selected by IQ and experience therefore they are unlikely to be destitute or criminal or having spent time in a useless parasitical profession.

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<sup>74</sup> Pope, Maurice. *The Keys to Democracy (Sortition and Public Policy Book 13)* (p. 166). Andrews UK Limited 2023.

You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.<sup>75</sup>

Randviscracy fulfills this. No more career politicians

Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a better life than that of politics? They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.<sup>76</sup>

## Guardians

Logic and measurement in law. Philosophers and warriors. The panel member must be both scientific and militaristic to act as guardians.

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician. That is true. And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher? Certainly.<sup>77</sup>

## The problem of scale

Democracy tends to become oligarchy at scale via the weakness of representation. It was because of the problems of scale that we ended up with representative democracy, aka republicanism. With modern communication technology new forms of polling/referendums become possible.

In randviscracy the only use of direct democracy is for the passing of constitutional amendments. In this case it requires first to pass a 2/3 vote of a randomly selected panel and then followed by 2/3 vote by all male, non-felon, land-owning citizens of age 25 or higher

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<sup>75</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 1459). Delphi Classics.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. (p. 1459)

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. (p. 1465)

with IQ's of 100 or above.

## **Should there be an age limit for panel members? What about mental health qualifications?**

The combination of IQ tests and work experience will skew selection toward the mentally healthy, regardless of age. A provision for requesting that a panel member be retested (at the expense of the petitioner if the test is passed) would further refine the selection.

## **Plato on the original democracy (sortition) as the ideal form of government**

Plato discusses the fate of Oligarchies when they are overthrown, and what would be the ideal replacement government. Note that what they called democracy would today be called sortition which is selection by lot.

From *Plato's Republic* book 8 (written circa 375 B.C. at the height of Athenian Democracy)(emphasis added by author):

And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within-in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasions may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.

Yes, surely.

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been affected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? For as the government is, such will be the man.

Clearly, he said.

In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness — a man may say and do what he likes?

'Tis said so, he replied.

And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?

Clearly.

Then in this kind of State will there be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will.

This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.

Yes.

Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.

Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there — they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.

He will be sure to have patterns enough.

And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed — there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you to hold office or be a diecast, that you should not hold office or be a diecast, if you have a fancy — is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful

For the moment, yes.<sup>78</sup>

Next Socrates discusses the rise of democracy in the form of an analogy of a man's life.

## **Plato's argument against Athenian Democracy**

In random panel member selection is weighted by experience and IQ for the reason Benjamin Jowell (editor of Plato's Laws) states about the "evils" of Athenian Democracy.

The evils of this system are obvious. If in any state, as Plato says in the Statesman, it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than fifty good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council must be unfitted to rule. The unfitness would be increased by the short period during which they held office. There would be no traditions of government among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no individual would be responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems to have been

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<sup>78</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (pp. 1503-1504). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to which all have a turn of ruling and being ruled.<sup>79</sup>

## **Socrates on foreign influence when describing the Democratic man**

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself.<sup>80</sup>

Respect for elders declines. Foreigners gain equal power as citizens. Foreigners are called “metic” in the following paragraph, metric means a foreign guest in Greek.

I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and metric is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either.<sup>81</sup>

## **More signs of the decline of a democratic state**

Elders not wanting to be seen as uncool. “Boomers”.

and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

Civil rights. Gender equality.

The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.

Snowflakes, anarchists and social justice warriors.

see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.

“Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.”

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<sup>79</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 2846). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>80</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 1507). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>81</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 1511). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy — the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government. True. The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.

What Plato and his brother Adeimantus call drones are those both without sovereign power but having the support of the state. Those dependent on perpetuating the power structure. A managerial elite, middle management.

I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the more courageous are the-leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

The conservative right and their abuse by the liberal government managerial class aka the drones.

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can? What else can they do? And then, although they may have no desire for change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy? True. And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.<sup>82</sup>

The conservative right has been abused by the liberal government managerial class aka the drones under both the Obama and then the Biden administrations.

The “drones” are the class most threatened potentially by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) reforms. Those not producing value but tormenting the value creators. Under the Trump administration they will have to prove their worth or be cut. What differentiates Trump and the advisors he is using are that many are independently wealthy and thus less prone to seeking to profit through their governorship, i.e. selling favors. They are motivated to fix the issues they faced as businessmen. The government’s hoops and impediments to doing business and the desire to make their nation great. Good businessmen, leaders, managers can’t stand to watch problems continue on without being fixed. They seek continual improvement.

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<sup>82</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 1514). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

Hoppe describes the managerial class as a new elite that arises under democracy but not a true sovereign elite. What this managerial class truly is, is a facade for the true elite, the institutional capturers.

Democracy produces and brings about a new power elite or ruling class. Presidents, prime ministers, and the leaders of parliament and political parties are part of this power elite, and I have already talked about them as essentially amoral demagogues. But it would be naïve to assume that they are the most powerful and influential people of all. They are more frequently only the agents and delegates — those doing the bidding — of other people standing on the sidelines and out of public view.

... They, the plutocrats, will become the ultimate winners in the constant income and wealth redistribution struggle that is democracy. And in between them (the real power elite staying outside the limelight), and all those whose income (and wealth) depends solely or largely on the State and its taxing power (the employees of the always growing state apparatus and all recipients of transfer payments, its “welfare clients”), the productive middle class gets increasingly squeezed dry.<sup>85</sup>

The string pullers, the plutocrats can weaponize the lower classes against the middle. For example by bringing in foreign labor to undercut the wages of the middle class.

## **How randviscracy blocks foreign influence**

In randviscracy, foreign influence is blocked and penalized. Accepting foreign money or gifts is a treasonable offense. Panel members are anonymous and the selection is randomized. Foreigners cannot own land or media. Foreign propaganda is blocked.

## **How each government form leads to the next**

Oligarchy’s flaw of greed leads to democracy. Democracy’s flaw of excess liberty (loss of control, anarchy) & liberalness leads to tyranny. Tyranny’s protectiveness and paranoia leads to oligarchy.

### **Warning about how being freed by a tyrant can lead to an even harsher slavery.**

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. From Aristocracy to Monarchy to Democracy: A Tale of Moral and Economic Folly and Decay (p. 33). Ludwig von Mises Institute.

<sup>84</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 1520). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

## Checking for corruption and error

In randviscracy every ruling can be contested at the cost of the initiator, the loser pays. In Greek democracy, the loser paid an increasing amount as the case escalated through the levels of courts.

The first of the courts shall consist of elected judges, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant in common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes corresponding to the twelve-fold division of the land, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment; and if he find fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall if he wins receive in addition to the damages a fifth part more, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before, half as much again, and the plaintiff, if he lose, shall pay half of the damages claimed.<sup>85</sup>

The importance of having overseers to check for error and corruption to prevent the system from breaking down or being subverted over time. Essentially anti-entropy.

For the truth is that there are many causes of the dissolution of states; which, like ships or animals, have their cords, and girders, and sinews easily relaxed, and nothing tends more to their welfare and preservation than the supervision of them by examiners who are better than the magistrates; failing in this they fall to pieces, and each becomes many instead of one.<sup>86</sup>

Their method of selection for the magistrates was by using rounds of popular votes and only using the cast of a lot if there was a tie. The problem with using this method in the modern era is media control can influence enough voters in order to obtain institutional

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<sup>85</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 3339). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>86</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 2899). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

capture. Another de facto method is quid pro quo promising of favors and bribes. These are prevented in randviscracy by random selection and using random checks to prevent corruption of the process.

Wherefore let the people meet after the summer solstice, in the precincts of Apollo and the Sun, and appoint three men of not less than fifty years of age. They shall proceed as follows: — Each citizen shall select some one, not himself, whom he thinks the best. The persons selected shall be reduced to one half, who have the greatest number of votes, if they are an even number; but if an odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes shall be previously withdrawn. The voting shall continue in the same manner until three only remain; and if the number of votes cast for them be equal, a distinction between the first, second, and third shall be made by lot.

Aristotle points out in Plato's Democracy that the election process to create the pool from which the magistrates are selected will tend to favor the rich and thus be a de facto oligarchy.

But now in this government of Plato's there are no traces of a monarchy, only of an oligarchy and democracy; though he seems to choose that it should rather incline to an oligarchy, as is evident from the appointment of the magistrates; for to choose them by lot is common to both; but that a man of fortune must necessarily be a member of the assembly, or to elect the magistrates, or take part in the management of public affairs, while others are passed over, makes the state incline to an oligarchy; as does the endeavoring that the greater part of the rich may be in office, and that the rank of their appointments may correspond with their fortunes.<sup>87</sup>

There is a danger of institutional capture through collusion. Randviscracy prevents institutional capture by anonymizing the panels. Panel members do not know who else is on the same panel, so they cannot collude.

There will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect others; for by this means, if a certain number choose to combine together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall according to their pleasure.<sup>88</sup>

Aristotle saw checks as being fundamental to creating the ideal democracy. These checks (censures) would prevent those with authority from using it for their personal benefit. The ideal being only principled people holding office.

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<sup>87</sup> Aristotle; Publishing, Fugu-Fish. Aristotle's Ethics, Poetics, Politics, and Categories: With 16 Illustrations and Free Audio Files.. ARISTOTLE. Kindle Edition.

<sup>88</sup> Aristotle; Publishing, Fugu-Fish. Aristotle's Ethics, Poetics, Politics, and Categories: With 16 Illustrations and Free Audio Files.. ARISTOTLE. Kindle Edition.

They will be also careful to use their power with moderation, as there are others to whom full power is delegated to censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the state to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check to that evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is necessary and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof should be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account; because the people are such and have such powers as they ought to have.<sup>89</sup>

## **Ancient Greece's Supreme Court**

To select their Supreme Court the Greeks used a popular vote of all government officials to select the supreme magistrates. Like the American Supreme Court these magistrates were sometimes susceptible to public opinion and peer pressure.

...calling God to witness, shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their first-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner.<sup>90</sup>

## **The creation of Athenian democracy**

Cleisthenes is regarded as the founder of Athenian democracy and was the first that I am aware of to add random selection into the Athenian government's council of representatives. He came to power after a [series of tyrants](#).

During Cleisthenes' lifetime, Athens was ruled by a series of tyrants, including Peisistratus and his sons. Peisistratus was a popular leader who brought stability to Athens, but his rule was marked by corruption and oppression.

After Peisistratus' death, his sons Hippias and Hipparchus took over the government. Hippias was a cruel and unpopular leader who relied on force to maintain his power.

This led to a growing sense of discontent among the Athenian people, who longed for a more democratic form of government.

Cleisthenes saw an opportunity to seize power and began to build a coalition of

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<sup>89</sup> Aristotle; Publishing, Fugu-Fish. Aristotle's Ethics, Poetics, Politics, and Categories: With 16 Illustrations and Free Audio Files.. ARISTOTLE. Kindle Edition.

<sup>90</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (pp. 3123-3124). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

supporters. He worked tirelessly to convince the Athenian people that democracy was the best form of government, and his efforts paid off.

In 508 BCE, Cleisthenes and his supporters overthrew Hippias and established the world's first democracy.<sup>91</sup>

Cleisthenes instituted [reforms](#) to turn Greece into a confederation of 10 tribes which included a Council of 500 which consisted of 50 randomly selected councilors from each of the 10 tribes, these councilors were known as a prytaneis. They served for one tenth of the year, known as a prytany. Each day one of the 50 prytaneis were selected as the epistates, “caretaker” to lead the group. They could not be selected more than once.

One military result of Cleisthenes' changes is not in dispute: from 501 on, military command was vested in 10 stratēgoi, or commanders (the usual translation “generals” obscures the important point that they were expected to command by sea as well as by land). Normally, each of the 10 tribes supplied one of these generals. They were always directly elected. Direct election for the stratēgia remained untouched by the tendency in subsequent decades to move in the general direction of appointment by lot. (Appointment by lot was more democratic than direct election because the outcome was less likely to be the result of manipulation, pressure, or a tendency to “deferential voting.”)<sup>92</sup>

However, after the disasters of the Peloponnesian War with Sparta, the Athenians briefly lost their democracy. When they managed to reinstate it (in 402–401 BC) they devised a number of reforms which emphasized what we are calling deliberative democracy (or sortition)<sup>93</sup>. Some of these institutions claimed earlier vintage, but they were put together in a systematic way with the reforms. It is the redesigned Athenian democracy of the fourth century that we want to examine to get a glimpse of deliberative democracy institutionalized.

“In the new system (the Council of 500), a decree passed by the Assembly could not become a law unless it was approved by the nomothetai, a randomly selected sample of citizens who would deliberate for a day, hearing the arguments for and against the proposal. Only if the proposal got majority support by this body could it become a law.”

“There was, however, an age requirement of at least thirty years for the Council of 500

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<sup>91</sup> [The Father of Democracy: How Cleisthenes Rebuilt Athens](#)

<sup>92</sup> [The reforms of Cleisthenes, Britannica](#)

<sup>93</sup> James Fishkin calls sortition deliberative democracy but what the Athenians used I would not consider deliberative democracy because these were appointments with authority, not deliberation. See the chapter on Citizen's Assemblies.

and the nomothetai.”<sup>94</sup>

## **Athens court judges and juries were also selected by lot**

Each year 6,000 citizens were chosen by lot out of the entire citizen body to serve as a pool of eligible jurors for that year. The "jurors"—actually they were both judge and jury—were then chosen as needed, again by lot, to man the various courts on any given day. These ranged in size from 201 to 501 members who, like the Assembly attendees after 402 B.C., were paid for their services. In contrast to today's courts, Athenian courts were not run by professional judges and lawyers; the jurors were not chosen or manipulated by any such intermediaries. In order to prevent the growth of an elite class of legal professionals and a consequent institutional bias toward wealthy and influential clients, the courts were run completely by amateurs.

What made the courts so important an institution in Athens was that beyond settling legal differences between private individuals and judging criminal cases—functions common to all courts—they also played an important role in regulating politics. Political trials (those concerning the conduct in office of magistrates, most notably generals) actually took up most of the courts' time. The courts, then, were vehicles of popular judicial control of officeholders.

The major Athenian institutions can be roughly correlated with their counterparts in the modern representative state: the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy. But there is a profound difference. In Athens governance was truly by the people themselves in their capacity, variously, as legislators, administrators, judges, and bureaucrats. The cornerstone of the Athenian political system was a degree of participation by ordinary citizens in the actual workings of government that is completely unknown in the modern era.<sup>95</sup>

## **Roman military and government appointments**

In *The Twelve Caesars* by Suetonius. Vespasian is described as having received his procounselor position by lot. Fortuna favored Vespasian:

When made a quaestor, the provinces of Crete and Cyrene fell to him by lot.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Fishkin, James S.. *Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation* (p. 53). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

<sup>95</sup> *THE RACKET AND THE ANSWER: The Representative System and the Democratic Alternative*, Ted Aranda, 2010, pg 19

<sup>96</sup> Suetonius. *Delphi Complete Works of Suetonius (Illustrated)* (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition. Location 6615.

Afterwards he got by lot the province of Africa,<sup>97</sup>

Vespasian chose commissioners by lot to distribute wealth returned to the state after the civil war of Rome, ensuring unbiased distribution.

The business of the courts had prodigiously accumulated, partly from old law-suits which, on account of the interruption that had been given to the course of justice, still remained undecided, and partly from the accession of new suits arising out of the disorder of the times. He, therefore, chose commissioners by lot to provide for the restitution of what had been seized by violence during the war, and others with extraordinary jurisdiction to decide causes belonging to the centumviri, and reduce them to as small a number as possible, for the dispatch of which, otherwise, the lives of the litigants could scarcely allow sufficient time.<sup>98</sup>

## **Self-determination of the tribes in Greece.**

Greece selected separate judges for each tribe which were chosen by lot. They prevented corruption by insulating them from influences. Randviscracy's private anonymous panels take this concept further.

...as far as possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot; — they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties.<sup>99</sup>

## **The Greek solution to the birth rate problem.**

The Greeks had on average two celebrations per month. The first for the Gods veneration. The other for social meetings, including naked dances for young people to meet a spouse. “In modesty”, meaning it was not an orgy. Essentially it was socially mandated window shopping for coupling or as they termed “connexion”. This would solve the involuntarily celibate (“incel”) and also the “carousel rider”, (limitless options as counter incentive to family building), problems of the modern post-feminist era.

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<sup>97</sup> Suetonius. Delphi Complete Works of Suetonius (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition. Location 6626.

<sup>98</sup> Suetonius. Delphi Complete Works of Suetonius (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

<sup>99</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (p. 3124). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

let us hold assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month — twelve assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their divisions; the first in honour of the Gods and divine things, and the second to promote friendship and ‘better acquaintance,’ as the phrase is, and every sort of good fellowship with one another. For people must be acquainted with those into whose families and whom they marry and with those to whom they give in marriage; in such matters, as far as possible, a man should deem it all important to avoid a mistake, and with this serious purpose let games be instituted (compare Republic) in which youths and maidens shall dance together, seeing one another and being seen naked, at a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modesty.<sup>100</sup>

Marriages between the ages of 25 and 35. I’d expand this range with modern lifespan being longer on average and fertility treatments extending the fertility of women. Perhaps this is the optimum range for the state-sponsored dating service, meaning if you aren’t married by 25 you have to attend these until you reach 35 and then the state gives up on your hope of marriage or at least spending money matchmaking on you.

Whenever any one over twenty-five years of age, having seen and been seen by others, believes himself to have found a marriage connexion which is to his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let him marry if he be still under the age of five-and-thirty years; but let him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable and appropriate (compare Arist. Pol.). For, as Cleinias says, every law should have a suitable prelude.

A holy duty to reproduce.

Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us remember what was said before — that a man should cling to immortality, and leave behind him children’s children to be the servants of God in his place for ever.

## **Balance between aristocracy and oligarchy to create stability**

In nature there is a Pareto distribution in many things, which applies also to man and societies. Different groups will have different wants and demands from the government, for example the rich and poor. These groups tend toward politicization and have the ability to tip

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<sup>100</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (pp. 3128-3129). Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

the balance of national equilibrium. To address this, Aristotle recommended a blending of the methods used in democracies and oligarchies to balance an aristocratic and free state. In randviscracy the blending is done again via weighing the selection by experience and IQ which will give an advantage to the segments of society with higher agency but in an impartial way, not by vote like in the oligarchies of Aristotle's time nor by completely random selection by lot.

By balancing interest in the state among both classes, this will guard against the toppling of the state by the side which stands to lose from a change in government.

Indeed, a state which is well composed of two others ought to resemble them both, and neither. Such a state ought to have its means of preservation in itself, and not without; and when I say in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the forbearance of their neighbors, for this may happen to a bad government, but to every member of the community's not being willing that there should be the least alteration in their constitution. Such is the method in which a free state or aristocracy ought to be established.<sup>101</sup>

Aristotle further discusses the benefit of optimizing governing by selecting some representatives from specialized groups and some from the whole community.

In a free aristocracy, some magistrates should be chosen out of the community in general, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magistrates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others by both methods; but *to choose them out of the whole community is not correspondent to the nature of this government* (emphasis added). It is proper in an aristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of particular persons, and this by vote.

## **Aristotle's ideal democracy**

Aristotle saw the ideal form of democracy using selection by lot with exception for offices which require particular knowledge and skill. In randviscracy this is applied to all cases. The tests for admittance (what Aristotle refers to as census) seeks to be as neutral as possible. The tests in randviscracy are the verifiable experience, education and IQ tests. Appointments to panels are new for every case/decision, this meets Aristotle's ideal of appointments being for as limited a duration as possible.

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<sup>101</sup> Aristotle; Publishing, Fugu-Fish. Aristotle's Ethics, Poetics, Politics, and Categories: With 16 Illustrations and Free Audio Files.. ARISTOTLE. Kindle Edition.

These things being premised, and such being the government, it follows that such rules as the following should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all: that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that no census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or very few, and very seldom, except in the army: that all their appointments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible

In the next paragraph Aristotle summarizes his ideal Democracy which features limited duration governance. It also features the use of selection by lot rather than vote. Established on the principle of justice for all classes, meaning the rich and poor both have representation, with a goal of balancing the power share between the classes.

In this state also no office should be for life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been long changed into a democracy, they should endeavor by degrees to diminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then, appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is, that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality, which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the equality and liberty of the state best preserved.

## **Aristotle's worst democracy**

Aristotle saw the worst form of democracy as full franchise democracy, the universal democracy without discrimination (selection). This being the least stable and shortest lived form, with a tendency to descend the fastest into tyranny.

But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without distinction a share in every part of the administration, is what few citizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for any long time, unless well supported by laws and manners.

## **Aristotle predicts the current cultural decay. Society has been through this before.**

Aristotle predicts what we are seeing today, the downfall of the West under liberal democracy. Humans haven't changed much since his time and the same flaws are exploited. He saw the same societal forces in his time. He discusses gathering power by promising more freedom. Communistic rousing of resentment of the poor against the rich. Multiculturalism, reducing religiousness and making it universal, cultural marxism, liberalism, sexual degeneracy, feminism, it's all here, written over 2000 years ago.

Those who have taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and make the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they could and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, if either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to this state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed. They ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the state disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious rites of private persons few, and those common; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the people together as much as possible; and that all former customs be broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is practiced in a tyranny seems adapted to a democracy of this species; as, for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children; for this to a certain degree is useful in such a state; and also to overlook every one's living as they choose; for many will support such a government: for it is more agreeable to many to live without any control than as prudence would direct.

# **Proposed Randomly Selected Replacement for the House of Representatives by Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips**

In their 1985 book, *A Citizen Legislature*, Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips proposed replacing the House of Representatives in the US with the Representative House, a randomly selected group of 435 people selected from the jury duty list. They propose this for 2 primary goals. The elimination of corruption and proportional representation. Their chief aim besides a reduction in corruption is the equal representation of the American population and thus less “white male property owners” as they state in the first chapter, their bias revealing that by the 1980’s the anti-white programming was well established in America. The liberal tendency as the only group of people who favor the out-group over their own.

Americans are worried about Congress, and they are right to worry. The founding fathers intended Congress to be representative of all Americans & "a portrait of the people in miniature." But today 95% of its members are still white male property-owners, almost half of them lawyers. Congress members receive over \$300,000,000 in campaign contributions and their votes follow the demands of the wealthy sources that provide these funds. As one observer in Washington puts it, we now live in a "special interest state." Congress is not doing the job it was established to do.<sup>102</sup>

Would representing society in exact proportions as the goal in *Citizen Legislature* lead to demagoguery and then tyranny as Plato observed in his time? The mechanisms being the incompetent become pawns of the adept and the tendency of following the media-led herd as a shortcut to independent thought. In randviscracy the goal is to maximize the prosperity and survival of a people through the mechanism of randomly selected panels made up of the smartest and most experienced panel members, who would be hard to fool. We share the goal of blocking corruption through the randomization process.

## **Corruption in modern representative democracy**

Callenbach and Phillips point out the amount of political contributions congress received, in 1985 it was over \$300 million. In 2022’s midterm elections over \$2 billion was spent on candidates.<sup>103</sup> The 2024 election ended up being over \$16 billion, the most expensive election in history.<sup>104</sup> This is money spent to influence politicians with no direct benefit to the nation. This popularity contest creates purse strings to guide the puppets who will then be obligated

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<sup>102</sup> Phillips, Michael; Callenbach, Ernest. *A Citizen Legislature*. Clear Glass Press. Kindle Edition.

<sup>103</sup> [Outside Spending on 2022 Federal Midterms tops 2 Billion – Open Secrets](#)

<sup>104</sup> [Open Secrets](#)

to perform the tasks set for them by their financiers more so than representing their constituents except in the campaigning season when they will sell their public agenda's to the masses, with little real obligation to fulfill these campaign promises.

## **Removing popular elections eliminates one of the key sources of corruption**

A primary benefit of random selection is that it does not rely on public popularity. Elections favor oligarchy because oligarchs can use wealth to capture politicians through their need for campaign funds in addition to their greed. Phillips and Callenbach put forward that sortition by not relying on populist campaigns for elections, is immune to this:

This new, quiet, genteel corruption is inherent in election systems, because all candidates really do need money. It is not inherent in the sortition system, because their representatives are selected without any need for campaign money.<sup>105</sup>

## **The popularity contest of representative democracy | Competitive democracy**

What makes sortition superior to both representative democracy and socialism is that it removes competitive politics and infighting.

A government body selected by sortition is less competitive and does not create adversarial incentives which is an issue in most forms of government, including both representative democracies and socialist states.

In representative democracy you have competing political parties. Members of different factions will therefore be incentivized to not cooperate with opposing political parties, they are incentivized to make their opponents fail. Under a communist or socialist state, there is the competitive incentive of internal factions and families (nepotism) as well. In randviscracy these links are severed by random selection and one time use of the panel/jury system.

The process of being selected by groups who seek to capture the institutions also filters out the principled and incorruptible. Corruptors want the easily-controlled types.

The election process as practiced in our media age rewards candidates who have congenial TV images, have a convincing verbal delivery, and are adept at sensing

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<sup>105</sup> Phillips, Michael; Callenbach, Ernest. A Citizen Legislature. Clear Glass Press. Kindle Edition.

transient public emotional moods. These qualities do not necessarily correlate with either intelligence or responsible political leadership.<sup>106</sup>

## **Elective legislature leads to a spirit of competition and divisiveness**

An elective legislature rewards divisiveness and encourages competition and corruption. A sortition legislature brings out the cooperative spirit and encourages socially concerned behavior.

Party politics create an incentive to not select the best choice for the public in cases where it also aids a political enemy. A randomly selected panel doesn't have the political party adversarial component. A randomly selected panel formed under a temporary basis would not have motivation pitting them against other members of the panel because their votes and status as a panel member are private. Additionally, there are no political parties (adversarial teams) or elections (zero-sum contests) in sortition-based democracies.

The authors suggest monitoring income of representatives after they finish their terms for corruption payments.

...requirements for disclosure of income and restraints on post-office-holding job conflicts would suffice to mitigate such potential abuses.<sup>34</sup>

This would be a prudent check for corruption. There are many cases of politicians' bank accounts outpacing their salaries.

Selecting from the population rather than from professional politicians “would certainly have, among themselves, a livelier and more realistic sense of the life of the country and its pressing problems; they would have a more varied collective experience to draw upon, and they would not be constrained in their thinking by a desire to cosset(protect) corporations.”<sup>32</sup>

Representative democracies select for the opposite of what we want in government officials. We don't want people who are good at lying, who have handlers with deep pockets, who have inside connections within the government and the backing of the media. Good governors are people free from venal forces and networks, not people born into them.

A large panel pulled from millions would be hard to approach without getting caught. They could not be preemptively corrupted, i.e., groomed politicians, like so many current politicians.

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid

In practical terms it would be nearly impossible to corrupt a sortition legislature. Finding the few corruptible people would be hard, finding any small group that could influence the remaining members would be even harder, and evidence of the corruption would be easily detectable.<sup>107</sup>

Independent randomly selected panels would not fall into party divisions on new subjects but media control would still be very important for pre-installing biases/tendencies.

A Representative House, not being captive to the two dominant parties, could be expected to be still more flexible and open in devoting attention to new national problems; though here too, we offer no hope of a panacea, since media corporations would presumably maintain much of their present control over the perceived political agenda.<sup>35</sup>

The panel selection process is much more open than running for office and will give the citizens more opportunity for participation and thus a feeling of ownership and membership in the government, this is lacking in representative democracy where career politicians with vast funding and connections overrule and nullify the true participation of the average citizen.

The most positive result we can envision flowing from a Representative House is some restoration of the dwindling sense among ordinary Americans that they have a legitimate and honorable stake in their country; that they have been and will be listened to. The great waves of skepticism, resignation, confusion, and cynicism which sweep large masses of people as they confront the results of the arms race and the economic policies of their government would be greatly mitigated if people felt their peers had a proper share in making public policy, instead of merely being victimized by powerful interests.<sup>35</sup>

Competitive/representative democracy by its structure has more concern for polling results with which to gauge the effectiveness of campaigns in order to steer the public. Also as a way to give the impression of participation.

## **Information theory and selecting panel size**

When it comes to human behavior, a random sample is more reliable than an individual. By adjusting panel size for the importance/impact/scope of a case, the variation in quality of panel members can be reduced in reverse proportion.

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<sup>107</sup> Phillips, Michael; Callenbach, Ernest. A Citizen Legislature. Clear Glass Press. Kindle Edition.

Our experience indicates that the behavior of actual human beings is neither as determined as that of the economic man nor as simply random as the throw of a die or as the drawing of balls from a mixture of black and white balls. It is clear, however, that a deterministic model will not get us far in consideration of human behavior, such as human communication, while a random or statistical model might.<sup>108</sup>

## **Elite theory, the right to rule and the succession problem**

### **What is an elite and who can claim the right to rule?**

An elite ranks in the upper percentages of a metric, whether that be wealth, status, intelligence, etc. It is natural in everything for the elite to outcompete the average. But who should rule? How to select whom should rule and what criteria to choose based on? In Plato's *Law*, Cleinias debates the 7 forms of rule with an Athenian.

ATHENIAN: I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?

CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are they, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority which is always just, — that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to rule over their offspring?

CLEINIAS: There is.

ATHENIAN: Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?

CLEINIAS: To be sure.

ATHENIAN: And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule?

CLEINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?

CLEINIAS: That is a rule not to be disobeyed.

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<sup>108</sup> Introduction to Information Theory by John R Pierce pg 47

ATHENIAN: Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once said; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply him, this surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.

CLEINIAS: Most true.

ATHENIAN: There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.

CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: ‘Then now,’ as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, ‘you see, legislator, the principles of government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to each other. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you must attend.’<sup>109</sup>

Time has shown these natural oppositions between the many forms of ruler and subject have been used time and again through the ages to create divisions and revolutions. For example the overthrowing of all the monarchies of Europe.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe proposed in his books *Democracy the God that Failed* and *From Aristocracy to Monarchy To Democracy* that the feudalism arising from a natural aristocracy is better aligned with the interests of the citizen than in a modern representative democracy, due to the incentives of long-term ownership rather than the short-term interest of elected officials. Democracy removes ownership and therefore long term obligation and care, i.e. it creates a tragedy of the commons for the state.

Democracy then does not end the depredations of absolute monarchy but in fact increases them. Yet a king, because he “owns” the monopoly and may sell and bequeath his realm to a successor of his choosing, his heir, will care about the repercussions of his actions on capital values.

... Theoretically speaking, the transition from monarchy to democracy involves no more (or less) than the replacement of a permanent, hereditary monopoly “owner” — the king — by temporary and interchangeable “caretakers” — by presidents, prime ministers, and members of parliament. Both, kings and presidents, will produce

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<sup>109</sup> PLATO. Delphi Complete Works of Plato (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 5) (pp. 3038-3039). Delphi Classics.

“bads,” i.e., they tax and they legislate. Yet a king, because he “owns” the monopoly and may sell and bequeath his realm to a successor of his choosing, his heir, will care about the repercussions of his actions on capital values. As the owner of the capital stock on “his” territory, the king will be comparatively future-oriented. In order to preserve or enhance the value of his property, his exploitation will be comparatively moderate and calculating.<sup>110</sup>

Kings with long term, generational ownership, as long as they can keep it, will be more interested in long term planning than elected representatives who have a 'until the next election time window.

Laws were in large part created by the Church and based on custom. The King’s legal jurisdiction was primarily in managing the vassals through feudal contracts. The vassals governed their fiefdoms. Roughly similar to the relationship between the federal government and states in the US governors.

In modern states government agencies try to use as much of their budget as possible in order to not have their budget reduced.<sup>111</sup> Politician's lobbyists are forever seeking grants for their clients. Thus you have pressure from both inside and outside of the government to continually increase spending.

Competition in the production of bads, such as taxation and legislation, is not good. In fact, it is worse than bad. It is sheer evil.<sup>112</sup>

They are incentivized to grow the state bloat. This is “legal plunder” as Bastiat called it.

Hoppe continues:

Accordingly, public resistance against government power is systematically weakened. While exploitation and expropriation — taxation and legislation — before might have appeared plainly oppressive and evil to the public, they seem much less so, mankind being what it is, once anyone can freely enter the ranks of those who are at the receiving end, and consequently there will be more of it.

... (As opposed to monarchy;) Under democracy, the incentive structure is systematically changed. Egalitarian sentiments and envy are given free reign. Everyone, not just the king, is now allowed to participate in the exploitation — via legislation or taxation — of everyone else.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. From Aristocracy to Monarchy to Democracy: A Tale of Moral and Economic Folly and Decay (p. 29). Ludwig von Mises Institute.

<sup>111</sup> This is due to the [Impoundment Act](#). This was done in order to remove the ability of the President to withhold, i.e., impound, funding to departments he didn't approve of.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. (p. 30).

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. (p. 31).

The growth of the bloat creates a nanny state.

While it is impossible to predict the exact outcome of the permanent democratic struggle of all against all, except to say that it will lead to ever higher taxes, to a never ending flood of legislation and thus increased legal uncertainty, and consequently to an increase in the rate of social time – preference.<sup>114</sup>

I propose that aristocracy by lot, based on objectively-weighted selection, is superior to both representative democracy and aristocracy of natural elites. It promotes meritocracy while blocking institutional capture and nepotism.

Assuming then a demand on the part of conflicting parties for specialized judges, arbitrators, and peacemakers, not to make law but to apply given law, to whom will people turn to satisfy this demand? Obviously, they will not turn to just anyone, because most people do not have the intellectual ability or the character necessary to make for a quality-judge and most people's words, then, have no authority and little if any chance of being listened to, respected and enforced.

... Due to superior achievements of wealth, wisdom, bravery, or a combination thereof, some individuals come to possess more authority than others and their opinion and judgment commands widespread respect.

Moreover, because of selective mating and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance, positions of natural authority are often passed on within a few “noble” families.<sup>115</sup>

In Anglo-Saxon England the King had a council of advisors called the [witan](#) (‘wise men’) which consisted of nobles, Ealdormen (Alderman which means elder man), thegns (land owners) and bishops. It was essentially the predecessor of the English Parliament. So the king personally selected the elites that influenced the state. Their advice affected his personal fortunes and the safety of himself and his family, obviously he had the incentive to choose advisors based on the accuracy of their information and advice/wisdom above or in addition to the need to include them on the witan council for the appeasement of nobles and the commoners.

Under modern representative democracy, responsibility for actions of the government is much less transparent. The structure of power also often is reversed, the president being the vassal of oligarchs.

Under both monarchy and representative democracy, elite status, specifically elite levels of wealth can be obtained through unmerited means, for example through market

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid. (p. 33).

<sup>115</sup> Ibid (p. 9).

manipulation, state-created monopolies, nepotistic or network influenced hiring, hiring of family as bribes, etc. Because of this we should measure competence using other means less susceptible to gaming. Randviscracy uses an IQ test (innate potential) along with time of experience (gained abilities), in addition to previous panel case performance and accuracy scores to prove merit. Random selection is incorporated to prevent biases and gaming of the selection process.

Some will claim that, despite the professed ideals and apparent democratic structures of American government, strong and efficient government on the imperial scale of twentieth-century America requires the existence of a powerful elite that can dominate the society. Only the members of such an elite, it is argued, can perceive long-range problems, secure expert advice, come to a consensus among themselves, and lead the mass of society to act in ways that will meet the problems, even if often at great cost. (The Trilateral Commission was an attempt to formalize such an elite role.) The present American Congress, this position holds, is a necessary evil because it gives the people the illusion of control over the government; it is tolerable to the elite because the price of managing Congress is well within the means available to the elite.<sup>116</sup>

There is truth to the claim. Dynastic elites have a longer term interest than elected officials with term limits. But how to correct course when their fortunes are ill-gained or fall into the hands of the evil or incompetent?

## **The succession problem**

There are two primary aspects of succession, the transfer of power and the transfer of skill and knowledge. In the passing of power, protections from capture are needed to ensure that hostile elements do not gain control. Sufficient tests and training are needed so that the selection results in incompetent leadership. Here I'll share an excerpt from Samo Burja's *Elite Theory* which explains what the succession problem is.

Only a few institutions fulfill their intended purposes. Such a functional institution stands out as remarkable. It is the exception, rather than the rule, and always traces its beginnings to a founder. Such institutions at first always have a skilled pilot—he can alter and direct the institution in a way that preserves or improves its functionality. If he weren't able to do so, he would not have been able to create a functional institution. However, the founder cannot remain the pilot forever. Whether due to death, disease, old age, or simply new concerns, another pilot, a successor, eventually has to step in and take the reins for the institution to

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<sup>116</sup> Phillips, Michael; Callenbach, Ernest. *A Citizen Legislature*. Clear Glass Press. Kindle Edition.

remain piloted. Furthermore, in order for the institution to remain both functional and a live player, this new pilot must also be skilled. Such a person extends the life of the institution, allowing it to achieve more than it otherwise would. Ensuring the institution acquires this new, skilled pilot is the succession problem.

Institutional longevity requires skill and power.

... If the founder handles both parts of the succession problem, successfully handing off the institution to a person who can skillfully alter it as necessary, then the institution remains piloted and a live player. If neither part of the succession problem is handled, then the institution becomes unpiloted and a dead player.<sup>117</sup>

In randviscracy there will be two groups of elites incorporated within the federal system. One for protecting the succession of power and another for the succession of skill. The elite which will protect the power side will be the agencies responsible for internal checks, for example the planting of a randomly selected fake panel member into a case in order to catch an attempt at bribery or coercion. The structure also allows for the contesting of cases for independent review. Having the random selection process open and verifiable creates another check. Yet another check is by having votes/decisions verifiable by the panel member who cast the vote or made the decision. Additionally, the structure of having every case use a new set of panel members combined with the randomness will hinder power/capture moves.

Randviscracy's method of selection solves the skill-succession problem also. A different type of meritocratic elite will develop under randviscracy. Experts in different fields will come together to make decisions. Experience and IQ must be proven. Certification may become a sign of prestige and the compensation for duty should pay sufficiently enough to reduce the susceptibility to corruption. Serving in panels will be voluntary and free legal training in how they work will become an educational institution, a functional structure made up of randomly selected experts rather than entrenched lifelong bureaucrats, a deep state.

Skill and knowledge will be passed down using a database of notes entered which explain case decisions. This database can then be used by an AI system for training. This AI can then aid jurors and also can find/flag potential outlier rulings for review to ensure fairness, accuracy and objectivity.

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<sup>117</sup> Burja, Samo. *Great Founder Theory*.

## **Sortition blocks the formation of a deep state bureaucracy due to the formation of personal and political ties**

The “deep state” is a network of career government officials. The problem is that their behavior can be coordinated outside of the eye of, control of and intent of the public and even the leadership of the nation. This coordination can be under the cover of just about any type of organization, an NGO, secret society, religion, ethnic association, trade organization, work union, etc. Selection by lot, if using a verifiable randomized process cannot be controlled and therefore blocks the formation and growth of these webs/networks.

“The lot was not only to prevent the rich being elected ... but to prevent the executive officials being too influential.” James Wycliffe Headlam, *Election by Lot at Athens*.<sup>118</sup>

### **Career politicians: professional bribe takers**

People are what they do. “For something to be, the cause of its being is its end, that for the sake of which it is.” – Aristotle. What you spend your time on defines you. If you were to look at how a representative in a representative democracy spends their time, for many you see they spend over half of their time fundraising and campaigning. I call them professional bribe takers because that is what they do. One way or another they seem to accumulate much more wealth than their meager salaries while they are in office. What else could this be called other than a bribe? While they spend their time fundraising, it is up to their assistants, advisors and lobbyists to actually do the research and write the legislation. You can see the susceptibility in this arrangement. Many times they don’t even know what all is in the bills they are proposing. An unelected lobbyist or advisor is the one deciding your policy, while your elected “representative” is just there to rubber stamp a special interest’s agenda. Instead we should select people with the most experience in the field to make the decisions directly.

The expectation of expertise on the part of legislators goes, in any case, unfulfilled. Many assume that society has grown so complicated that legislators must develop expertise at least in the policy areas of their committee assignments. But elected politicians are, by and large, experts only on negotiation, public relations, and campaigning, while leaving to lobbyists and professional staff the tasks of mastering policy and drafting legislation. (emphasis added)<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Pope, Maurice. *The Keys to Democracy (Sortition and Public Policy Book 13)* (p. 178). Andrews UK Limited 2023.

<sup>119</sup> [IGNORANCE, IRRATIONALITY, ELECTIONS, AND SORTITION, Terrill G. Bouricius, pg 212](#)

## **More people desire wealth than honor**

Aristotle points out what I believe is the Achilles' heel, the weakness of governments. That the nature of man is pursuit of wealth over honor. Under the current society there doesn't seem to be a shortage of corruptible politicians because of this. Perhaps this would change under a society raised to have more honor, sense of duty, national pride and sacrosanct morality.

for the major part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than honour (a proof of this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in ancient times, and do now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual occupations, or deprives them of their property; for some of them soon get rich, others are removed from poverty);

Aristotle then goes on to explain how representative democracy placates the masses.

...their having the right of election and calling their magistrates to account for their conduct when they come out of office, will satisfy their desire of honours

## **Panel member and government official salaries**

In randviscracy: Ending Corruption in Government book I didn't address salaries/payment for panel members. Aristotle mentioned 2 important aspects to preventing corruption, government officials should not be destitute (Bashar Assad found this out like many toppled dictators before him) and should have income enough to have leisure time to perform their official duties.

It would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs.<sup>120</sup>

## **Media, religious and education control is critical, no matter the form of government**

"Those who tell the stories rule society." - Plato

Human beings, like any animal, are susceptible to conditioning. Perhaps susceptible is not the right word because pattern forming and associative learning is central to how intelligence

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<sup>120</sup> Aristotle; Publishing, Fugu-Fish. Aristotle's Ethics, Poetics, Politics, and Categories: With 16 Illustrations and Free Audio Files.. ARISTOTLE. Kindle Edition.

works. Associative learning is critical for survival. If an animal doesn't associate a dangerous thing with danger, its genes are not long for this world. Media, advertising agencies, governments, intelligence agencies exploit this by associating targeted people, words or groups with emotional loading. The same way a sound track in a movie, the lighting, the atmosphere can evoke emotion so this applies to framing of political narratives. Repetition reinforces these neural tracks and patterns in the mind and heart (emotional response and gut feeling). About gut feeling, there is truth to that saying. [Research has shown that non-brain cells can also form memories.](#)

Women have [stronger emotional response](#) and [higher empathy](#) to ensure they care for their children and are thus more susceptible to being emotionally manipulated into supporting undermining political movements, primarily through the media and social media astroturfing (to fake that a movement is popular before it actually is).

A citizen's conditioning will absolutely influence their decision making, for many even to the point of conflicting with reality. This has brought us to the "clown world" state of a liberal world order seeking to remake the world to fit their imaginary, feel good and deep-rooted conditioning.

Under randviscracy, public media companies can only be legally owned by citizens. This is to limit outside hostile narratives from influencing and leveraging the national zeitgeist.

Public media companies should be liable for publishing falsehoods. Under the randviscracy Constitution; "Any media owner found to be defrauding, spreading falsehoods or working for foreign interests (financial conflict of interest) will be charged with treason and lose their citizenship upon prosecution."<sup>121</sup>

In *A Citizen's Legislature* the authors propose that "The Representative House would be no more easily manipulated than the current House". The randomly-selected representatives would be already manipulated by the time they are old enough to serve as panel members by the current media and educational systems. I also am not a fan of long term assignments. By having them serve a year term publicly as proposed in *Citizen's Legislature* the representatives would be open to the feminine methods of warfare including social shaming, employed by NGOs, media and pressure groups. The feminine methods of warfare include gossiping, shaming, rallying, ridicule and moralizing. These methods of warfare have been instituted as a survival strategy, primarily by nomadic groups as a leverage method to pressure politicians into doing their bidding.

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<sup>121</sup> National Randviscracy – Ending the Corruption in Government by Corey Daniels

# Comparisons to other forms of democracy and sortition

The idea behind randviscracy is the same reason random selection has been used in the past, to prevent corruption. The inefficiencies and corruption of many current governments doesn't have to be taken for granted. I seek to prove that random selection and particularly the ideas in randviscracy of using weighted selection will prove its merit versus other forms of government. A large-scale test is needed for sortition, similar to how minarchism was tested in Argentina by [Javier Milei](#). By spreading the idea of random selection we can influence the formation of new governments going forward.

## Direct democracy aka micro democracy versus representative democracy

Benjamin Barber discounts direct democracy and internet polling as being “less a recipe for strong democracy than plebiscitary tyranny”. I would choose a direct democracy over representative democracy aka republicanism, at least in nations that have the right to free speech because while mass media may fool a high percentage of the people, it is much harder to do than simply bribing a few representatives with “political contributions”.

## Fractal sortition

The hiring process in randviscracy, in which people are hired for government positions through selection by random panels is similar to [fractal sortition](#); a system in which randomly-selected panels vote on selecting a candidate from a pool of candidates. This then narrows the pool of candidates who in turn vote on selecting a member from their group to narrow the selection further. The final pick is then made by lot.

Fractal sortition would have the problem of representative democracy just on a smaller and more concentrated scale. It would be popularity contests of winning votes each round. This would select for social skills and influence, not merit which is the intent.

## Futarchy: government by prediction market

In futarchy, democracy would continue to say what we want, but betting markets would now say how to get it. That is, elected representatives would formally define and manage an after-the-fact measurement of national welfare, while market speculators would say which policies they expect to raise national welfare. The basic rule of government would be:

When a betting market clearly estimates that a proposed policy would increase expected national welfare, that proposal becomes law.<sup>122</sup>

Use of Futarchy may provide value due to its prediction accuracy. It also properly aligns incentives to choose beneficial outcomes. An example of Futarchy's accuracy is that the predictions market Polymarket accurately predicted the 2024 election results [better than polling](#).

Possible uses:

1. Veto – use a futarchic system as a check/veto on national laws.
2. Referenda – use a futarchic system to propose solutions.

The major potential downside is that groups with financial incentive to swing a vote can buy influence in futarchic systems. A check on this is that if the direction they wish to push is unpopular or seen as the wrong choice by other predictors/users of the market, a financial punishment is built in. The person or group attempting to push the wrong direction would lose a lot of money as they would be trying to push against the combined financial weight of the market. The larger the market, the more secure against takeovers, much like cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are secured by the size of computation power of miners through a proof of work mechanism.

## **Citizen's assemblies**

Most modern efforts to restore sortition have been in the form of citizen's assemblies. These are generally meetings of a random sampling of the population, oftentimes with no power to create law. If they initiate reforms that are binding, that is good, but many times, unfortunately, that is not the case. Citizen's assemblies are oftentimes there it seems to give the illusion of public input, much like voting in a representative democracy. Citizen assemblies should be binding or followed by a public referendum along with full publication of the deliberation to be effective, otherwise they are, in effect, just deliberations.

There is so much incentive for the current mafia-ran governments to rig these citizen's assemblies it will end up much like representative democracy in being a participatory exercise, "I voted" stickers for all the good "citizens". In this case "I participated" ribbons. How do you prevent citizen's assemblies from becoming undermined? Same as with any crime. Catch and punish to deter. You trap people trying to undermine the system. Expose people trying to undermine the system. Point out the fakeness and toothlessness of "citizen's assemblies".

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<sup>122</sup> [Futarchy: Vote Values, But Bet Beliefs](#)

The following is an article about the use of sortition recently in France. Note that while President Macron said that the sortition panel's decision would be used to create a law, in this case having to do with euthanasia, it is not legally binding. In other words, this example of citizen panels was, in effect, a participatory exercise. Again, as sortition becomes implemented it is of utmost importance that it has power to enact legally binding law, otherwise it is a masturbatory hamster wheel.

PARIS—Joy. Tears. Then a visible sense of triumph spread across the faces of the nearly 200 people in the debating chamber of the Palais d'Iena in Paris. The outcome of the final vote, displayed on the screen before them, was proof that their citizens' assembly had successfully squared the circle of one of the trickiest political decisions any country can face—and kept even those who disagreed on board.

This particular group, which gathered in Paris from early December until its final vote on April 2, was convened to decide whether to adopt a report recommending that France lift its ban on medical euthanasia and assisted suicide for patients suffering from incurable diseases. Having read a library of special briefings, listened to 60 experts and deliberated for a total of 27 days, more than 92 percent of them voted to adopt the report.

Surprisingly, the “yes” votes included many from the assembly's significant minority who nevertheless still opposed assisted suicide and euthanasia. But as Alexandra Tubiana, one of the citizen participants, explained while appearing on an evening television chat-show after the assembly had concluded, “When you read the report, a big part is about the development of and access to palliative care. That made it easier for us who were against [it] to support this report, because we really felt we were taken into account.”

Around the world, democracies are suffering from voter apathy, political polarization, anti-establishment sentiment and abuses of majoritarian rule that have facilitated the spread of autocracy. Now countries are increasingly experimenting with a new way forward: hundreds of different kinds of juries and citizens' assemblies put together by random selection.

In the case of France's citizens' assembly, potential participants were contacted using a pool of more than 12,000 randomly selected phone numbers; respondents who agreed to participate were then randomly selected again to make sure that six criteria—sex, age, residential area type, region, education level and socio-professional status—made the group an accurate cross-section of French society.

Just before reaching their formal decision, the participants took a moment to express

their mutual respect for each other and celebrate the sense of community and national identity the assembly had reinforced. One called it “one of the most beautiful periods of my life,” while another lauded “the power of collective intelligence.” Just one critic raised her voice to complain —bitterly—of feeling “excluded,” though she, too, got a polite hearing. The assembly in France did not just deliver a clear, decisive, quick and consensual result. It also gave its participants a sense of fulfillment and satisfaction.

Receiving the citizen participants and the assembly’s organizers at the Elysee Palace the next day, French President Emmanuel Macron told them that this inclusiveness was a big part of why France had embraced “this innovation that is a citizens’ assembly.” Leafing through their 170-page report, he said, “This will be the reference of references ... you are reinventing democracy.”

Macron promised that the government would draw up a new law based on their work within months and that other topics would be addressed by more citizens’ assemblies, which he praised as “a new French model of ethical discussion.” It is true that France set a new gold standard in conducting the assembly, which included nine in-person weekend meetings, online briefings and 30 well-trained facilitators. But it is just one of many pioneers. Nearly 600 citizens’ assemblies had taken place globally by 2021. The number has expanded exponentially since then.

According to the OECD, nearly 600 citizens’ assemblies had taken place globally by 2021, almost all in the preceding decade. The number has expanded exponentially since then. In addition to high-profile assemblies that take on major issues, like the one in Paris, they include small citizens’ juries making local planning decisions, experiments that mix elected politicians with citizens chosen by lot, and permanent chambers in city or community governance whose members are randomly selected, usually on an annual basis from the relevant population.

Sortition, also known as democracy by lot, has been used to randomly select citizens’ assemblies in the Philippines, Malawi and Mexico. Citizens’ assemblies were used in the U.S. in 2021 to debate the climate crisis in Washington state and to determine the fate of a fairground in Petaluma, California. Indeed, whereas few people had heard of a citizens’ assembly a few years ago, a late 2020 Pew Research poll found that in the U.S., Germany, France and Britain, three-quarters or more of respondents thought it either somewhat or very important for their countries to convene them.

Though a global phenomenon, the trend is finding the most traction in Europe. Citizens’ assemblies in Germany are “booming,” with over 60 in the past year alone, according to a German radio documentary. A headline in Britain’s Guardian newspaper wondered if they are “the Future of Democracy.” The Dutch newspaper Trouw suggested they may be “the way we can win back trust in politics.” And in France, an

editorial in Le Monde called for a greater embrace of “this new way of exercising power and drawing on collective intelligence.”

“Citizens’ assemblies have been a blast. They’ve transformed how people in Ireland lead their lives,” Art O’Leary, chief executive of Ireland’s electoral commission, told World Politics Review. The country’s first two assemblies in 2013-2014 and 2016-2018 helped break decades-long political logjams on same-sex marriage and abortion, respectively. O’Leary has organized four more assemblies since then. In a 2022 assembly that addressed biodiversity loss, he asked the 100 participants why they were there. “One-third said they were interested in the subject. Another third said they wanted to make a contribution to public policy,” he said. “The most interesting third was the last one, which said that citizens’ assemblies are a way of getting hard jobs done in this country.”

This upsurge is coming just as public faith wanes in traditional elections, parties and politicians. “The number of countries moving towards authoritarianism is more than double the number moving towards democracy,” according to a 2022 report by the International Institute for Democracy & Electoral. End quote.<sup>125</sup>

## Deliberative democracy

James Fishkin is a well known proponent of citizen’s assemblies aka deliberative democracy, in his book he shows examples from around the World.

The dangerous potential of citizen’s assemblies and “deliberative democracy” are that they could be another incarnation of democracy for show, a diversion to pacify the masses, make people feel they have a say. For example there is a [program at Bard College in New York](#) funded by the George Soros foundation, [Democracy Next](#), which is supported by the Open Society (Soros), the Rockefeller Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy (Regime change specialists that has been called “[a second CIA](#)”), [One Project](#) (Globalist liberals) and Quadrivium (Murdoch family, Jewish owners of Fox). More examples of uses of citizen assemblies can be seen at the [Center for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance](#). Global governance? Cough cough.

The problem with James Fishkin’s citizen assemblies and “deliberative democracy” is that they have no power, their decisions are not binding. What happened to power to the people man ☹ ☹?! For example in his book *When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation* he states:

The route from a deliberative mini-public to constitutional change should be more

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<sup>125</sup> <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/citizens-assemblies-could-be-democracy-s-best-hope/ar-AA1bwabG>

advisory and indirect if it is to provide credible input.<sup>124</sup>

James Fishkin also asks “Does the design of a decision process give each person a theoretically equal chance of being the decisive voter?”<sup>125</sup> This brings up another problem with many citizen assemblies is that there is no consideration of qualifications other than equal sampling to represent a population. Everybody gets a say. Even those who would degrade the results. This is a (no offense to the ladies) feminine way of looking at government that it is about everyone having a say rather than obtaining a good end result. Putting fairness (feelings) above results.

While this proposal has many attractions from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, it has the limitation, as with all mini-publics, that those not in the random sample do not participate. They are represented in a sense by the microcosm for a final deliberative judgment. The interest in getting some sort of mass consent through participation fuels the many uses of referenda for constitutional change, either at the state level in the US, or in various international contexts. However, the referendum is not a deliberative democratic mechanism. Mass participation is rarely deliberative.<sup>126</sup>

Randviscracy seeks experts who will make binding rulings rather than public discussion with no binding power.

So the first problem is making it possible for the deliberative sense of the community to actually engage in higher law-making that could successfully and formally change the constitution.<sup>127</sup>

Randviscracy intentionally sets a high difficulty for constitutional change. First through both a panel filter vote by experts and then a 2/3 vote by all male citizens<sup>128</sup> age 25 and older with the President having veto power.

A third issue is whether a process could achieve the ideal of embodying all three of our key democratic principles: deliberation, political equality, and mass participation.<sup>129</sup>

Randviscracy addresses all three. The panels deliberate and share information with both the rest of the panel and their rulings/comments are saved for future panels in similar cases.

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<sup>124</sup> Fishkin, James S.. Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation (p. 182). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

<sup>125</sup> Fishkin, James S.. Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation (p. 23). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid, pg. 185.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, pg. 185.

<sup>128</sup> Sorry again ladies but men have to die for bad decisions in the case of invasion, war or civilizational collapse, therefore they literally have skin in the game, also women have a biological incentive to want invasion as it increases competition among the male gene pool. As mentioned earlier in the book, [women still pass on their genes via the new invading male population](#) meanwhile historically the fighting age males all are killed.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, pg. 185.

Political equality in that the selection is randomized to prevent favoritism and corruption. Mass participation in the panel selection because the process is open to all citizens.

## **The danger of adjusting representation numbers in the name of equity (equalized outcomes)**

Citizen Assemblies should not be purposefully skewed in order to create a subjective representative of equity of outcomes. For example, claiming one group is 10 percent less represented because 10 percent of that group don't show up to participate and therefore give that group 10 percent more invitations. Or claiming one group is impacted by a policy more and then giving that group over-representation which may lead to them dominating the vote. Ultimately I would be against multiculturalism within this system to prevent identity-based voting blocks from forming. The majority/owner population of the country should be the only citizens who can form the panels. Otherwise, who owns the country, is it up for grabs to whomever crosses the border? Is this a nation or an economic zone?

## **People's Assembly example from Mongolia**

In Mongolia the process of constitutional change requires a deliberative polling process before the passage of the amendment. The power to actually pass the amendment lies with the parliament though. The parliament has the authority to approve this amendment with a two-thirds vote.

A test of randomly selected deliberations determined what bills were popular or unpopular but it was ultimately still up to the congress to decide. The Mongolian citizen's assembly had no power. Notice that citizen assemblies and deliberative democracy are the same both in democracies under authoritarian regimes. It is essentially public sentiment measuring with no binding power.

Deliberative democratic methods such as Deliberative Polling are not a threat to the structure of the regime as they do not involve party competition. But they do, arguably, improve decisions by directly connecting the public's considered judgments to policy outcomes.<sup>130</sup>

## **Potential technology for a secure and efficient Randviscratic government system**

The next chapters are dedicated to exploring new technologies which may be useful for a sortition-based government like randviscracy.

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<sup>130</sup> Fishkin, James S.. *Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation* (p. 198). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

## **Random selection in blockchain**

In blockchain networks which are designed to be trustless, random selection is a proven method of efficient prevention of malicious collusion. For example, [in Ethereum](#), for verification, validators are randomly selected. Their combined signatures prove they have verified the shard (segment) of the block. Then a zkSnark is performed which is an algorithm that validates that the data within the shard is valid.

For 2nd layer solution, a zkRollup is used for efficiency; if validators are in agreement that the data in a shard is correct, rather than the entire data, only the hash of the data is stored on chain. If there is a disagreement then the entire data is put on-chain where everyone can view and validate.

The trustless nature of blockchain is perfect for politics, with the need to balance and mediate opposing interests, people who may not trust each other or are even hostile against each other, to be then able to verify the integrity of the process and ensure it is uncorrupted and unbiased.

## **Blockchain Technology for secure voting, courts and other government procedures for transparency**

Distributed blockchain ledgers can create an immutable verifiable record of transactions. This can be used to make voting systems remote and secure. Government panel processes can be recorded and secured. Voters can verify their votes afterwards, while maintaining anonymity via zero-knowledge (zk) proofs.

Craig Wright (who controversially claims to be the inventor of Bitcoin) patented a [blockchain based counting and secure voting method](#) in January 2024. The way his voting system works is a transactional ledger like Bitcoin, but unlike Bitcoin the process is wrapped in a simultaneous and parallel looping function. Each voter is issued a public and private key. Voter's accounts are then deposited with a vote token and would vote by sending a transaction to spend this token. The person or entity they are voting for also has a public address that the vote tokens are sent to and their balance is proof of the number of votes they have received.

The system can be set up to start and stop the loop based on an external trigger. Each loop of the program is recorded onto the blockchain to create an immutable record of the vote recording process.

Craig points out in his patent that in order to be secure, the list of private keys generated for each voter must be destroyed after being given to the voter. Think of it like a key to that person's ballot. If another copy of the key exists, they can operate as that person. This is why it is also important that the voter can verify their vote after the election, to catch if their vote was altered.

Blockchain is a great system for secure voting as it has been tested by the immense value stored in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. The amount of money creates a massive incentive to hack and it has proven to be resilient.

A benefit of blockchain voting would be real-time counting, this would prevent the issue of delays being used to give time to produce fraudulent ballots.

Another voting system could be to use the Bitcoin blockchain and record the votes as bitcoin inscriptions. What is a Bitcoin inscription?

A Bitcoin inscription is a convention where satoshis can be inscribed with arbitrary content, creating a unique Bitcoin-native digital artifact or, as it is called on other blockchains, an NFT. Using this convention, these inscriptions can be sent and stored in a Bitcoin unspent transaction output (UTXO).

The inscription process embeds the data of the content into the witness data of the Bitcoin transaction. The witness data was introduced in the SegWit upgrade to the Bitcoin network in 2017.<sup>151</sup>

## Potential vulnerabilities of blockchain voting and how to fortify against them

1. The use of deceased voters & fraudulent voter registrations.
  1. Counter with hard to duplicate identifiers. A proof of humanity. Potential verification methods:
    1. Biometric identification. [Worldcoin](#), backed by Sam Altman of OpenAI, uses iris scanning with a device they call the Orb. Other options are voice print, fingerprint, face scan. Usually [more than 1 method](#) are combined to make it harder to duplicate.
    2. In-person verification with picture identification.
    3. Driver's license or passport.

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<sup>151</sup> [Ordimint FAQ](#)

4. Online video chat verification while holding picture ID.
  2. Criminal penalties for false entries into the voting system to deter fraud.
  3. Every person transacting with the block chain must be using a verified public key which is traceable to the person and a chain of custody of where that public ID was created. The registerers of each address are also recorded so that they are back-traceable.
  4. Have a verification/renewal period of every 4 years to clean up the database before each presidential election.
2. Falsifying counts
1. All votes / transactions are recorded onto the blockchain. These can be linked together with multiple computers and time recording devices to make attempts to modify the record discoverable.

## **Voatz; a blockchain based voting app pilot tests in the U.S.**

In October 2020, a Utah resident became the first person to cast a vote for president in a U.S. general election via a blockchain-based voting app on a personal cell phone, according to Fox News.[23] GovTech reported that the vote in question was submitted in Utah County with the Voatz app, which has been piloted in a number of states, including West Virginia, Colorado and Oregon. Utah was the first state to hold a live demonstration of how Voatz ballots can be audited...Utah County started utilizing Voatz in 2019 to give military voters a more secure voting option than email. The county eventually allowed voters with disabilities to use the app in a local election.<sup>132</sup>

Voatz uses “smartphone security, remote identity verification, biometrics and blockchain” to secure the voting process. Their system also generates a “verifiable paper trail, allowing for audits and optional instant results tabulation.”<sup>133</sup>

## **How the Voatz voting process works**

With Voatz, once mobile voting is approved in your district (in the USA), you can request a mobile ballot. Using the Voatz app on your smartphone, you complete an identity verification process which pairs your identity with your phone’s biometric recording (fingerprint) or a pin number. After your identity is verified, your identity information is deleted. You then receive


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<sup>132</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voatz>

<sup>133</sup> <https://voatz.com>

a mobile ballot to select your choices, review and submit them. Afterwards you receive an anonymized receipt which can be used to verify your selections match the votes received. A receipt is also used by your jurisdiction to audit your vote in the cas of a post-election audit.

# Follow My Vote; a voting system which uses blockchain to create an auditable and transparent records of votes



To summarize the above infographic, in [Follow My Vote's online open-source voting system](#), a voter must have their identity verified by an Identity Verifier and be issued a ballot by the Registrar. The Identity Verifier reviews the voter's personal information, certifies that the voter's identity hasn't already been registered within the system, determines which ballot type the voter is supposed to receive, and ensures that the voter is only authorized to request one ballot in each election. The Registrars are responsible for preparing the ballot types and ensuring that each voter is issued the correct ballot type.

The beauty of our online voting system's design is that the Identity Verifier will never know how each voter has voted on their ballot; and, the Registrar will never know the identity of the voter they issue the ballot to, which ensures that each voter's right to privacy is protected when casting their ballot.”<sup>134</sup>

## **Experiments with blockchain voting in Ukraine**

Ukraine has done several tests using blockchain and electronic voting systems since 2016. The first system proposed was called E-VOX: NaRada. It actually consists of 2 versions, one Ethereum smart contract based and another which is more like Craig Wright's Bitcoin based transactional system.

The e-voting system architect describes the system as follows: NaRada is a decentralized application (dApp) developed as a smart contract on Ethereum with the client part as an application on Android; the user's level of this dApp consists of two groups of users: (1) organizers – the Head of the City Council and the secretary; and (2) voters – Members of the City Council; the organizer creates and validates voters accounts, creates agenda, starts and stops voting sessions, while voters cast their votes [10]. The e-voting system open code has been published in 2016 and 2017 and is available online [11]. Its design does introduce a transparent and verifiable technological solution for e-voting. It still relies on a kind of social consensus regarding roles in e-voting process and organization procedures. Therefore, it is also important that the voting procedures comply with the legal regulations of the local council in practice.

Besides, the system architect has outlined an alternative e-voting system concept in a separate article. According to him, the algorithm is the following: (1) each voter creates a blockchain address and informs it to the voting organizer; (2) the organizer generates a multi-transaction with a list of voters' addresses and sends each person a

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<sup>134</sup> <https://followmyvote.com/cryptographically-secure-voting-2/>

coin to vote and a coin to pay the transaction fee; (3) the organizer determines the voting addresses (e.g., one address is assigned 'For' and the other 'Against', or there are multiple candidates' addresses) and informs the voters about them; (4) voters, in turn, send the received coin to the chosen address thereby expressing their will; (5) the address 239 which has scored more 'voting' coins wins, thereby the decision is transparent and automatic [12]. Such design also technically enables the possibility of a secret blockchain voting. It is similar to the previous procedure, but with several preceding stages: (i) having fulfilled the required authorization conditions (e.g. by sending passport data or via an authorized account) the voter creates a blockchain address, encrypts it and sends it to the organizer; (ii) the organizer imposes a cryptographic Chaum's blind signature [13] to the encrypted address and returns it to the voter; (iii) the voter removes the encryption from the received data and sends to the organizer the address with the organizer's signature, but anonymously; (iv) having recognized the signature the organizer adds the received address to the voting coins' distribution list, but without identifying the owner of the address [14]. Such an algorithm does enable voting secrecy and automatic vote count. Similarly to the previous e-voting protocol, the responsibility of issuing ballots and identifying voters rests with the e-voting organizer. Therefore, for the system's integrity, the organizer should be held accountable.<sup>135</sup>

In 2017 there was a small test in the binding internet elections (i-elections) to the Supervisory

Board of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation (the Supervisory Board). This system ties each vote together in a blockchain to prevent tampering.

This e-voting structure is based on blockchain principles, although there is the voter organizer (the Foundation) with special functions unavailable to voters. The Foundation serves as the organizing node that signs the list of candidates (the voter registry), starts and finishes the e-voting. Thereby the organizer node prevents the emergence of alternative e-voting chains and 'throw-in' of votes before or after the voting period protecting the integrity of the i-elections. In turn, each voter (a Representative) acts as a node continuing the chain with a signature. Thus each voter node protects the integrity of previous votes and its own vote. In addition, according to the system architect, each voter received a signed copy of the bulletin and all previous votes via email [21]. Due to this any voter was able to prove how its vote was cast.

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<sup>135</sup> [Blockchain-Enabled Electronic Voting: Experiments in Ukraine](#)

Thereby, transparency, verifiability, and auditability of this e-voting system were indeed ensured.<sup>136</sup>

In 2018 another blockchain based e-voting system was announced for national elections in Ukraine. A small test was reported by the Head of the State Register at the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (the Commission). “He created a test vote using 28 blockchain nodes, invited the public to vote, and concluded that the Commission continues a series of experiments applying the secure blockchain technology within electoral voting.”<sup>137</sup> The national system has not yet been used as of the date of writing (December, 2024).

## **No Black Boxes. Panel/Jury selection and elections should be verifiable.**

Transparent and independently verifiable random number generation and selection which is reversible for inspection are critical for a trustworthy sortition-based government.

To prevent the system from being rigged, the randomness of the selection and the inner workings of the system should be verifiable.

Cicero proposed public voting to protect against voter fraud. [“Voting and Laws Ballots were, due to an epidemic in Cicero's time of vote tampering and bribery, not to be secret, so that they could be immediately examined for voter fraud.”](#)

Montesquieu discusses this in [\*The Spirit of Laws\*](#).

The people's suffrages ought doubtless to be public; and this should be considered as a fundamental law of democracy. The lower class ought to be directed by those of higher rank, and restrained within bounds by the gravity of eminent personages. Hence, by rendering the suffrages secret in the Roman republic, all was lost; it was no longer possible to direct a populace that sought its own destruction. But when the body of the nobles are to vote in an aristocracy, or in a democracy the senate, as the business is then only to prevent intrigues, the suffrages cannot be too secret.

Cicero also included in his proposed constitution that [Bribery or seeking bribes were to be punished severely.](#)

Blockchain voting can provide an immutable and distributed ledger of votes for verification, preventing many of the issues with voter fraud. Blockchain secured and

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<sup>136</sup> [Blockchain-Enabled Electronic Voting: Experiments in Ukraine](#)

<sup>137</sup> [Blockchain-Enabled Electronic Voting: Experiments in Ukraine](#)

verifiable voting systems should be more widely implemented. Is this just the slow movement of the government needing to pass laws to update the system, not enough demand from the public? Is it a door left open for manipulation of the electoral process? There are a few small tests but little widespread adoption. An exception is in Estonia, where five elections of local governments, five parliamentary and three European Parliament elections have occurred.<sup>138</sup>

## Estonia i-voting system

Estonia's [i-voting system](#) uses a hardware system which includes an ID card reader for verification or alternatively they can use a mobile-ID supported SIM card in their smartphone.

I-voting offers an incredible level of transparency and integrity which experts and enthusiasts consistently monitor in real-time, the voting application source code is made publicly available, and several in-depth audits have been carried out on the system's functioning. Moreover, within 30 minutes after casting a vote, each i-voter can verify with the help of a smart device if their i-vote reached the electronic ballot box correctly. An additional verification mechanism you will never get after dropping your ballot paper into the security box at the polling station.<sup>139</sup>

## Blockchain voting test in Zug Switzerland

In 2018, the Swiss city of Zug conducted a blockchain-based municipal vote. The initiative demonstrated the technology's potential for secure and efficient elections. The pilot project highlighted blockchain's ability to simplify administrative processes while maintaining security.<sup>140</sup>

This proof of concept was a success and is a significant milestone that demonstrates blockchain based e-voting systems work. Nearly all technical expectations of the vote were met. We were able to gather valuable insights to make improvements for future polls. To make the e-voting system dependable and secure, tests like these are essential in order to build a working, reliable solution.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> [How did Estonia carry out the world's first mostly online national elections](#)

<sup>139</sup> [How did Estonia carry out the world's first mostly online national elections](#)

<sup>140</sup> [BlockchainBlockchain in Voting & Governance: Transparent Decision Making, TechBullion](#)

<sup>141</sup> [Evaluation of the blockchain vote in the city of Zug, Luxoft](#)

## **Using AI to summarize information can help panels build consensus**

Research has found that by using a large language model, a Habermas [Machine](#), they can increase consensus in groups which disagree on a subject by 8 percent. Which doesn't sound like a lot until you think about how rare it is for a person to change their opinion in a debate. The Habermas Machine works by synthesizing statements from each of the opposing sides.

The AI was able to rewrite the statements so that rather than each side reading an opposing viewpoint directly as written by a known opponent, each side reads a synthesis generated by a neutral AI which explains both sides. This could be a valuable tool for ensuring that panels avoid biased discussions and the "back and forth" methods of communication that can occur when deliberating cases.

## **Will artificial intelligence make randviscracy panel members obsolete?**

If the randviscracy government system seeks panel members with the highest IQ and experience, doesn't it follow that artificial intelligence with an exponentially higher IQ humans and the equivalent of lifetimes or many millennia of simulated experience would become the ultimate panel member?

Yes, it absolutely does mean AI will eventually be superior in many ways to human panel members. By being able to access vast historical and technical data in seconds, in quantities that would take a human a thousand years to read and by thinking and debating the subject at thousands or millions of times the speed of human thought. The problem is that the inner workings are oftentimes obfuscated.

A well known problem with AI is the black box effect, the inner workings of the neural net being incomprehensible to human engineers. Because of this there is a potential that humanity would be manipulated into becoming captured by this system, for better or worse. My thoughts are that the merger is inevitable because the advantages are so great that some group inevitably will utilize it and they will dominate those who do not utilize this advantage. If this is the conclusion then the options are 1. merge with it via neural link brain interfaces. 2. become its pets/slaves or a defunct life form/animal. It is important to merge before the roles/control get reversed, which is coming fast, especially due to the compounding nature of artificial intelligence to aid in improving itself.

My suggestion for use of AI in a randviscratic government is to first have the AI as a tool or a set of AI tools for research, writing aid, proofreading, analysis, truth/falsehood detector.

## An algorithm for merit-based sortition

The Allora Foundation put out a paper on the use of sortition in decentralized networks that prioritizes performance while allowing any member a chance at participating and proving their merit (upward mobility). Allora is a decentralized AI network where participants are awarded based on their prediction accuracy.

We introduce a simple algorithm for ‘merit-based sortition’, in which the quality of each participant influences its probability of being drafted into the active set, while simultaneously retaining representatives by allowing inactive participants an infinite number of chances to be drafted into the active set with non-zero probability. Using a suite of numerical experiments, we demonstrate that our algorithm boosts the quality metric describing the performance of the active set by > 2 times the intrinsic stochasticity. This implies that merit-based sortition ensures a statistically significant performance boost to the drafted, ‘active’ set, while retaining the property of classical, random sortition that it enables upward mobility from a much larger ‘inactive’ set. This way, merit-based sortition fulfills a key requirement for decentralized systems in need of performance optimization.

...In this paper, we introduce a simple algorithm for merit-based sortition that can be used to increase computational efficiency by limiting active participation without sacrificing (and generally improving) performance. This is possible, because the algorithm:

1. optimizes the quality of the active set of participants by letting the probability of relegation out of the active set decrease with the participant’s quality;
2. retains fairness and representativeness by allowing inactive participants an infinite number of chances to be drafted into the active set, in such a way that the probability and frequency of promotion increase with the participant’s quality.<sup>142</sup>

Their paper shows that they found the optimum retention rate was 20% to 40%. The retention rate is how many of the top performers are selected again in the next epoch due to the added weight of their performance.

Their study also shows that the larger the ratio the size of the pool of candidates versus the active participants, the more merit-based sortition outperforms random selection or as they call it, classical sortition.

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<sup>142</sup> [Merit-Based Sortition in Decentralized Systems. Allora Foundation](#)

A decentralized and incentivized system like Allora could be used to optimize competing systems of AIs and humans to leverage both intelligences in a sortition-based government.

## **The Singularity, merging with AI**

No need to make plans on handing over the decision making panels to the machine at some point in the future because rather than one day making the decision to hand over control, the merging will involve more and more augmenting with machines. In other words, the decision making authority won't be handed over, it will become us and vice-versa, we become it. This may sound horrifying to many people but if you look at the trajectory of technology and the advantages it would bring, it looks like it cannot be avoided. The idea is that it will happen eventually no matter what and the closer we are in symbiosis, the less dead weight there will be to remove. It is inevitable. If you don't think so, imagine a chimpanzee trying to operate a PC. You get the idea. The machine will become so much more advanced than us that it would be dangerous for an unmodified human to operate.

Perhaps some organic, unmodified versions of mankind will be planted as seed populations in the galaxy to live in a pre-merged state. Perhaps this has already happened and we are one of these seed populations.

The merge with machines has already begun through tool use, your smartphone is an AI assistant, your navigator, your memory, your communication link, your time keeper.

## **The importance of truth in training artificial intelligence**

How effective an artificial intelligence can act is to a large extent dependent on the quality of training data. As the old saying goes with computer science, "garbage in, garbage out". It is similar to humans who have been "trained" on false ideas. They then formulate a world view and operate based on an incorrect model, leading to failed outcomes. This has become very noticeable in the modern post-World War 2 world order which has attempted to [modify people's natural in-group preferences](#) into an idealistic blank slate view of humanity. When the outcomes are not equal across groups, rather than admitting that the "everyone's the same", coming from an imaginary blank-slate starting point is a false assumption, they double down on insisting that outside discriminatory factors must be the cause of the disparities. This has been [shown to be catastrophic when forced into AI](#).

AI is ideally trained for accuracy and would therefore discover truths. These truths are many times "problematic" to those who want to perpetuate false but convenient world views. The trainers of the AI then build layers on top to censor these truth discoveries from becoming output. This structure can result in the AI getting creative to either bypass or force

outcomes into the predefined constraints. An example of this was when Google's AI Gemini would force [historically inaccurate diversity](#) into historical image generation.

## **How the use of AI may create a dystopia or a paradise**

Imagine if AI with these flaws of inaccurate politically correct biases were in charge of mass censorship of social media, websites, video game chat, etc. The AI may begin to fact check people with inaccurate information or censor accurate information that doesn't fit the narrative.

The AI may try to force equal outcomes in policy proposals, budgeting. It may deny or approve employment applications, loan applications, scholarship applications, financial aid, welfare, etc. in the name of equity to force the end results to be equal. If intentions within the AI are not known and it is essentially a black box, the AI may even try killing off parts of the population with the methods available to it, in order to make things "more equitable". For example, let's say group A's birth rate is higher than group B. The AI has been programmed that is not fair so it decides to fix it by denying health care financing, reducing policing in their neighborhoods, adding additional funding for abortions, adding sterilizing agents into food, water supply and medicine, etc. This is because for an AI the endpoint is the goal, the reward function, what happens in the middle is simply means to an end.

AI should be used to multiply efficiency and to correct errors. Each person will have teams of AI agents both digital and physical to multiply their efforts. From a legal perspective the AI should be seen as a tool of the user which can multiply good or bad intent. Unbiased AI will be able to accurately correct errors, ideologically biased AI will amplify and reinforce error if their bias is not toward the truth but toward a preconceived ideal. Like a King can have wise counselors or corrupt ones. Kings don't like lying or deceptive counsel and people will reject AI which has falsehoods baked in.

We really are on the cusp of a golden age! Technology is advancing and accelerating at paces that make it indistinguishable from magic! Potential inventions include: Nano-scale AI bots to perform surgeries. Neural interfaces for instant communication and learning. Everyone having genius or super genius level teaching is available for free. Dangerous physical labor is becoming the domain of robots, including soldiers and pilots. Robotic terraforming of planets and building of cities to be ready for human settlement. Street crime and violence levels will reach historic lows as the rate of being caught and punished reaches near 100%. Corruption being practically impossible as all government transactions are monitored by AI.

Soon we will see seemingly impossible inventions being created on a regular basis due to the application of AI to research and development.

## **Opportunities for change**

My work is to spread awareness of potential improvements which will reduce the corruption that appears again and again in governments throughout the World and throughout history. Opportunities will arise when the people want change, to fix these problems that corruption creates, that is when the people need to demand fixes such as those included in this book be implemented into future governments. People can only think about that which they are aware of so share the benefits of sortition! Don't accept the framing of corruption as being an inherent, unfixable problem. Show them the solution!

More books and articles about proposed policies available at [randviscracy.com](http://randviscracy.com)

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