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Randviscracy, Uncategorized

Elite theory, the succession problem and preventing the formation of a deep state bureaucracy

This is an excerpt from my upcoming book, tentatively titled Making Democracy Great Again: the Return of Athenian Democracy & the Case for Selection by Lot. Subscribe to our email list to get updates when it is released.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe proposed in his books Democracy the God that Failed and From Aristocracy to Monarchy To Democracy that the feudalism arising from a natural aristocracy is better aligned with the interests of the citizen than in a modern representative democracy, due to the incentives of long-term ownership rather than the short-term interest of elected officials. Democracy removes ownership and therefore long term obligation and care, i.e. it creates a tragedy of the commons for the state.

Democracy then does not end the depredations of absolute monarchy but in fact increases them. Yet a king, because he “ owns ” the monopoly and may sell and bequeath his realm to a successor of his choosing, his heir, will care about the repercussions of his actions on capital values. 1

There is evidence to support that indeed the incentives were aligned better under medieval feudalism. Kings did not have law making power in many regions. Laws were in large part created by the Church and based on custom. The King’s legal jurisdiction was primarily in managing the vassals through feudal contracts. Roughly similar to the relationship between the federal government and states in the US.

I propose that aristocracy by lot, based on objectively-weighted selection, is superior to both representative democracy and aristocracy of natural elites. It promotes meritocracy while blocking institutional capture and nepotism.

Assuming then a demand on the part of conflicting parties for specialized judges, arbitrators, and peacemakers, not to make law but to apply given law, to whom will people turn to satisfy this demand? Obviously, they will not turn to just anyone, because most people do not have the intellectual ability or the character necessary to make for a quality-judge and most people’s words, then, have no authority and little if any chance of being listened to, respected and enforced.

… Due to superior achievements of wealth, wisdom, bravery, or a combination thereof, some individuals come to possess more authority than others and their opinion and judgment commands widespread respect.

Moreover, because of selective mating and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance, positions of natural authority are often passed on within a few “noble” families. 1

In Anglo-Saxon England the King had a council of advisors called the witan (‘wise men’) which consisted of nobles, Ealdormen (Alderman which means elder man), thegns (land owners) and bishops. It was essentially the predecessor of the English Parliament. So the king personally selected the elites that influenced the state. Their advice affected his personal fortunes and the safety of himself and his family, obviously he had the incentive to chose advisors based on the accuracy of their information and advice/wisdom above or in addition to the need to include them on the witan council for the appeasement of nobles and the commoners.

Under modern representative democracy responsibility for actions of the government is less much less transparent. The structure of power also often is reversed, the president being the vassal of oligarchs.

Under both monarchy and representative democracy, elite status, specifically elite levels of wealth can be obtained through unmerited means, for example through market manipulation, state-created monopolies, nepotistic or network influenced hiring, hiring of family as bribes, etc. Because of this we should measure competence using other means less susceptible to gaming. Randviscracy uses an IQ test (innate potential) along with time of experience (gained abilities), in addition to previous panel case performance and accuracy scores to prove merit. Random selection incorporated to prevent biases and gaming of the selection process.

Some will claim that, despite the professed ideals and apparent democratic structures of American government, strong and efficient government on the imperial scale of twentieth-century America requires the existence of a powerful elite that can dominate the society. Only the members of such an elite, it is argued, can perceive long-range problems, secure expert advice, come to a consensus among themselves, and lead the mass of society to act in ways that will meet the problems, even if often at great cost. (The Trilateral Commission was an attempt to formalize such an elite role.) The present American Congress, this position holds, is a necessary evil because it gives the people the illusion of control over the government; it is tolerable to the elite because the price of managing Congress is well within the means available to the elite.2

There is truth to the claim. Dynastic elites have a longer term interests than elected officials with term limits. But how to correct course when their fortunes are ill-gained or fall into the hands of the evil or incompetent?

The succession problem

There are two primary components of succession, power succession and skill/merit succession. In the passing of power, protections from capture need to ensure that hostile elements do not gain control, or that the selection results in incompetent leadership. Here I’ll share an excerpt from Samo Burja’s Elite Theory which explains what the succession problem is.

Only a few institutions fulfill their intended purposes. Such a functional institution stands out as remarkable. It is the exception, rather than the rule, and always traces its beginnings to a founder. Such institutions at first always have a skilled pilot—he can alter and direct the institution in a way that preserves or improves its functionality.

If he weren’t able to do so, he would not have been able to create a functional institution.

However, the founder cannot remain the pilot forever. Whether due to death, disease, old age, or simply new concerns, another pilot, a successor, eventually has to step in and take the reins for the institution to remain piloted. Furthermore, in order for the institution to remain both functional and a live player, this new pilot must also be skilled. Such a person extends the life of the institution, allowing it to achieve more than it otherwise would. Ensuring the institution acquires this new, skilled pilot is the succession problem.

Institutional longevity requires skill and power.

The succession problem has two components: power succession (handing off the reins of the institution, keeping it piloted) and skill succession (transferring the skill needed to pilot the institution well, keeping it a live player).

If the founder handles both parts of the succession problem, successfully handing off the institution to a person who can skillfully alter it as necessary, then the institution remains piloted and a live player. If neither part of the succession problem is handled, then the institution becomes unpiloted and a dead player.3

In Randviscracy there will be two groups of elites incorporated within the federal system. One for protecting the succession of power and another for the succession of skill. The elite which will protect the power side will be the agencies responsible for internal checks, for example the planting of a randomly selected fake panel member into a case to catch attempt at bribery or coercion. The structure also allows for the contesting of cases for independent review. Having the random selection process open and verifiable creates another check. Yet another check is by having votes/decisions verifiable by the panel member who cast the vote or made the decision. using zero-knowledge proofs, meaning the person who cast the vote or in the case of an audit, the auditor is also granted a key to view their vote. Cases have a random chance of being audited. The structure of having every case use a new selection combined with the randomness will hinder power/capture moves.

Randviscracy’s method of selection will solve the skill-succession problem. A different type of meritocratic elite will develop under Randviscracy. Experts in different fields will come together to make decisions. The panels are voluntary. Experience and IQ must be proven. Certification may become a sign of prestige and the compensation for duty should pay sufficiently to reduce the susceptibility to corruption. Serving in panels will be voluntary and free legal training in how they work will become an educational institution, a functional structure made up of randomly selected experts rather than entrenched lifelong bureaucrats, a deep state.

Skill and knowledge will be passed down using a database of notes entered which explain case decisions. This database can then be used by an AI system for training. This AI can then aid jurors and also can find/flag potential outlier rulings for review to ensure fairness, accuracy and objectivity.

Sources:

1 Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. From Aristocracy to Monarchy to Democracy: A Tale of Moral and Economic Folly and Decay (p. 9). Ludwig von Mises Institute.

2 Phillips, Michael; Callenbach, Ernest. A Citizen Legislature. Clear Glass Press. Kindle Edition.

3 Burja, Samo. Great Founder Theory.

Also published on the Project for a New American Century website.

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